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ABSTRACT 
In the Shadows of Dominion: 
Anthropocentrism and the Continuance of a Culture of Oppression  
by 
Christopher Shields 
  
The oppression of nonhuman animals in Western culture observed in societal institutions and 
practices such as the factory farm, hunting, and vivisection, exhibits alarming linkages and 
parallels to some episodes of the oppression of human animals.  This work traces the foundations 
of anthropocentrism in Western philosophy and connects them to the oppressions of racism, 
sexism, and ethnocentrism.  In outlining a uniform theory of oppression detailed through the 
marginalization, isolation, and exploitation of human and nonhuman animals alike, parallels 
among the groups emerge as the fused oppression of each exhibits a commonality among them.  
The analysis conducted within this work highlights the development and sustainment of 
oppression in the West and illuminates the socio-historical tendencies apparent in the oppression 
of human and nonhuman animals alike.        
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Here I am! Here I am! Where are you? 
-Michael Daly, Topsy 
  
The lament of oppressed humans and other animals has echoed across time, rarely heard 
and even less often acknowledged.  Within the immense sphere of human and animal oppression, 
the life and death of an elephant named Topsy is one example of the repercussions of human 
dominion.  Her story has become ingrained in the history and folklore of American culture, not 
for how she lived but for the manner in which she died.  Ironically, the giant mammal was named 
after a fictive young slave girl torn from her mother at a very young age, as depicted in Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin.1  Much like her namesake, Topsy the elephant came to the 
United States and lived under the stringency of oppression.  She was taken from her mother and 
home in an Asian jungle, loaded on a ship and brought to America, where she was enslaved by 
showmen and forced to perform in the Forepaugh Circus for nearly three decades.2  Her life 
consisted of continual abuse; she was mercilessly beaten, cut, and burned by her masters.  
Topsy’s rise to historical notoriety began after she killed one of her handlers who had tried to 
feed the normally docile animal a lit cigarette.3  The episode would forever bind one of the 
country’s innovative giants, Thomas Edison, with the three-ton animal in a spectacle that would 
transcend the time.   
1Michael Daly, Topsy: The Startling Story of the Crooked Tail Elephant, P.T. Barnum, and the American Wizard, 
Thomas Edison (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2013), 16-17. 
2 Ibid., 10. 
3 “Coney Elephant Killed,” The New York Times, January 5, 1903. 
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The final act of oppression against the elephant ultimately would be in taking her life, but 
the means by which it was achieved forever set the story of Topsy within American lore.  A 
January 5, 1903, New York Times article titled, “Coney Elephant Killed,” chronicled the 
elephant’s execution.  Over 1,500 spectators arrived at Coney Island to witness Topsy’s death.4  
The means to end the animal’s life consisted of administering her carrots laced with potassium 
cyanide followed by an electrocution performed by employees of the Thomas Edison Company, 
there to showcase the power of human innovation.5  In an excerpt from his book Topsy, Michael 
Daly details the events of the January 4, 1903, public execution of the gentle giant: 
 
Topsy was chained by all four feet to construction pilings so she would be kept in place 
even if she now decided to move.  A noose was looped around her neck and attached to 
the donkey engine. The wires were dragged over. Topsy immediately complied when she 
was instructed to raise her right foot for the first death sandal.  “Not so vicious,” a 
reporter remarked aloud.  Topsy seemed less a wild animal than a mild one. Another 
reporter later wrote, “She stood still in the application as quietly as could be asked, 
obeying all commands of the men even when telling her to get down on her knees.”  
After the second electrode was fitted on her rear left foot and she was again standing, 
Topsy did become mildly bothered. She shook off the electrode on her forefoot, but soon 
it was secured again and there she stood, nearly three decades after being torn from her 
mother and smuggled into America, where she had traveled tens of thousands of miles in 
perpetual servitude, endured innumerable beatings, and survived more than a dozen train 
wrecks. Her big dark eyes with their extravagant elephantine lashes glimmered with what 
a reporter discerned to be still at her core.6 
 
Daly continues, 
 
The camera was running and recorded Topsy again trying to shake off the electrode on 
her right forefoot. The electrode stayed in place. She set her foot back down and was 
standing motionless when the 6,600 volts coursed through the wires and the electrician, 
Thomas, closed the switch at the park. There were flashes and small blue flames and then 
smoke began to curl up from where copper met foot. Some would describe the smell as 
that of burning flesh, others that of burning hoof. The pain must have been excruciating 
4 “Coney Elephant Killed,” The New York Times, January 5, 1903. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Daly, 323-325. 
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and her huge form shook violently. . . The smoke rose up around her flanks and she 
pitched forward into it, tipping to the right as her right foreleg buckled. The chain on her 
left leg grew taut with the fall, restraining her even in her last instant, drawing the limb 
straight out, displaying the electrode at the bottom of the foot. . .The many witnesses to 
the electrocution concurred that Topsy had died without making a sound. There is no way 
of knowing if, in those final instants, she had made one of those cries below the level of 
human hearing, which a scientist of the next millennium would term a contact call and 
explain as a simple message elephants in the wild send to other elephants across great 
distances of savannah and jungle. Such a cry would have carried past the gawkers and 
across the grounds and the beach beyond and out over the sea, fading to an unheard 
whisper over the waves. 
 
Here I am! Here I am! Where are you?7 
 
Less than a quarter century before Topsy’s arrival in New York Harbor, alone and afraid, the 
hushed voices of black slaves still reverberated throughout America’s southland.  They, too, 
were forced into servitude, their bodies beaten and abused by their masters, denied the basic 
rights now afforded to most human beings, and their cries, like those of the broken elephant, 
were hidden away in the shadows of dominion:  “Here I am! Here I am! Where are you?”8 
7 Daly, 323-325. 
8 In his book Critical Regionalism: Connecting Politics and Culture in the American Landscape (University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007), Douglas Reichert Powell details a similar incident regarding the public execution of another 
female elephant.  The elephant’s name was Mary and she was hanged to death on a crane in a railroad repair 
facility in Erwin, Tennessee, just over a decade after the electrocution of Topsy.  Mary, who was part of the Sparks 
Circus during a fall 1916 tour through the South, killed her trainer Walter Eldridge after he struck her on the head 
after she paused to pick up a watermelon rind on a parade route in Kingsport, Tennessee.  Following the trainer's 
death, an angry crowd, reminiscent of the lynch mobs of the time, demanded that “Murderous Mary” be killed on 
the spot. Attempts to shoot the large African elephant failed, and the Sparks Circus moved to its next stop in Erwin, 
the home of the Carolina, Clinchfield, and Ohio Railway repair facility.  With equipment capable of exterminating 
the giant mammal, the town would stand as Mary’s final stop.  According to Powell, “Surely the value of the 
spectacle was not lost on Charlie Sparks [circus proprietor], who had the elephants paraded out to the rail yard in 
between the matinee and the evening performances, whereupon Mary was strung up from the crane on a 7/8’’ 
chain.”  The first attempt resulted in the chain around Mary’s neck breaking, and the elephant falling five feet back 
to the ground.  A larger chain was strung around her neck and Mary’s giant form was finally hoisted off the ground 
where she hanged until she died.  A crowd of anywhere from several hundred to several thousand witnessed the 
execution.  The event notably shares a linkage to the racially motivated lynchings of blacks in the South and, as 
Powell points out, some accounts of the event also claim that Mary’s two black keepers were hanged alongside of 
her. See pp. 10-18.  
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 It seems an absurdity that people pursuing fundamental principles of freedom and liberty 
founded a nation based on discrimination (e.g., racism, sexism, classism, ethnocentrism, 
anthropocentrism).  Yet, the commonality of oppression has stood the test of time, dimming the 
glow of the shining city upon a hill.  Scholarship within the humanities and social sciences has 
attempted to comprehend the intricacies of oppression, employing both pragmatic and theoretical 
methods to address the idea as a problem in and of itself and as a response to other social, 
historical, or philosophical elements that contribute to its existence; however, this is not to say 
that academia’s frequent undertaking of the subject has been exhaustive.  Unaddressed 
complexities in the concepts regarding oppression emerge once examination of the subject is 
situated in a different perspective.  Academic disciplines primarily have centered their discourses 
on the human as the prominent object of inquiry.  In neglecting the oppression of nonhuman 
animals as a source of comparison to understand fully human oppression, or the oppression of 
any sentient being for that matter, the potential to create important linkages between the two is 
limited, and essentially minimizes the scope for new knowledge.  This is not to say that animals 
are absent from academic discourses, rather that certain hesitancies exist in comparing the 
similarities between human and nonhuman animals, especially when they are fused in similar 
historical circumstances of oppression.  This could be a reflection of anthropocentric attitudes 
that undoubtedly formed and were reinforced in the organization of knowledge sets or also in a 
tentativeness not only to revisit, but also to compare, animal suffering to certain episodes of 
human suffering (e.g., American slavery and the Holocaust).  The problem that arises when 
making such comparisons is that episodes of human suffering often seem too sacred to expose, 
thus maximizing the divide between human and animal.  The scholars who pressed the limits 
between human and animal suffering have contributed immensely to a conceptualization of the 
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forces involved in human oppression and have extended the boundaries of ethics to those who 
historically have been excluded from moral consideration.  In conceiving the overall emphasis of 
this work, scholars Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Carol Adams, Dominick LaCapra, Charles 
Patterson, and Marjorie Spiegel, among others, have influenced profoundly my understanding of 
oppression and the shared similarities existing in the historical marginalization of certain groups 
of humans and animals.   
 In arguably the most prominent work ever written on issues related to animal welfare, 
Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation in 1975 set in motion a public debate that alerted and informed 
the general public to the plight of the nonhuman animal.  Singer's words, contained in the preface 
to the first edition of the book, transcend historical eras, ethical systems, and the distinctions 
between human and nonhuman animals.  According to the author,     
This book is about the tyranny of human over nonhuman animals.  This tyranny has 
caused and today is still causing an amount of pain and suffering that can only be 
compared with that which resulted from the centuries of tyranny by white humans over 
black humans.  The struggle against this tyranny is a struggle as important as any of the 
moral and social issues that have been fought over in recent years.9  
 
In situating the significance of animal welfare within a context similar to that of the abolition 
movement, Singer not only pioneered a linkage deserving of further consideration, he also 
eroded the limits of the human—animal divide.  The research and methodology within this work 
centers on a related idea of how humans investigate and interpret the circumstances of 
oppression; what connections can be made and what can be learned when humans discard their 
anthropocentric ideology and examine the forces of oppression outside of the limits of 
anthropocentrism.  Positioning the scope of my research on American culture from the 
eighteenth century until the present allows me to make an inquiry into oppressive forces that can 
9 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (New York: New York Review of Books, 1990), i. 
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be compared across time and among the marginalized groups of human and nonhuman animals.  
In merging historical incidences of oppression in America by highlighting the objectification and 
repression of women, the enslavement of black humans, and the subjugation of animals through 
factory farming, in particular, undeniable similarities surface substantiating the existence of a 
culture of oppression.  This claim is the focus of Chapter Two that details consistent forces 
conditioning and perpetuating an environment of oppression that transcends historical contexts 
of American culture and applies equally to the oppressed (human and nonhuman animals).  
Chapter Three traces the industrialization of slaughter and the capitalist model of the factory 
farm, where efficiency and profit drive the continuance of slavery, or an, “eternal Treblinka,” in 
the words of Isaac Bashevis Singer, for the animal victims of unrestrained human dominion.  
Chapter Four queries the moral status of nonhuman animals by explicating the ideologies of Tom 
Regan and Peter Singer in determining whether a rights discourse or a utilitarian methodology is 
best equipped to minimize the divide between human and animal.  In referencing slave 
narratives, contemporary news accounts, and secondary works are important.  Among the latter, 
critical are Spiegel’s The Dreaded Comparison and David Brion Davis’s Inhuman Bondage.  
Chapter Five accentuates the parallels within the grasp of dominion through an exploration of 
slavery as a transhistorical facet of American culture.  Chapter Six examines Carol Adams’ work 
The Sexual Politics of Meat in emphasizing the linkages between sexism and speciesism and how 
both sustain a culture of oppression and contribute to the joint marginalization of animals and 
women.  The final chapter will revisit the human—animal divide by analyzing the approach of 
posthumanism in acknowledging a resounding mutuality between the two, a likeness engrained 
in the very essence of what it means to possess life and in the recognition of a shared 
vulnerability to suffering.
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CHAPTER 2 
TOWARDS A THEORY OF HUMAN AND ANIMAL OPPRESSION 
 
These causes of oppression, rooted in history, remain a profound, indeed determinative, 
part of the twenty-first century and continue to restrain the development of enlightened 
thought and ethical social and economic practices. 
 
-David Nibert, Animal Rights/Human Rights: 
Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation 
 
In the summer of 2005, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) launched a 
multi-city exhibit and online gallery as part of a campaign labeled “Animal Liberation.”  The 
exhibit featured provocative images of American slaves and other groups of oppressed humans 
alongside an array of similarly depicted animals, a shackled human foot beside that of a shackled 
hoof, the branding of a slave alongside the branding of cow, and so on.  Accompanying the 
images was the following summary: 
What is the common link between all atrocities in our society's past?  The African slave 
trade, the massacre and displacement of Native Americans, the oppression of women, and 
forced child labor, were the products of a dangerous belief that those with power have the 
right to abuse those without it. . . The only difference is that yesterday's victims—used 
and abused because they were 'different' and powerless—are now of other species.1 
 
The comparison evident in the exhibit sparked outrage across the country.  Shortly after the 
campaigned launched, controversy ensued over what critics presumed to be a racist comparison.  
The NAACP released a statement in opposition to the exhibit, when spokesman John White said, 
“PETA operates by getting publicity any way they can.  They're comparing chickens to black 
people.”2  Mark Potok of the Southern Poverty Law Center called the comparisons “disgusting,” 
1 William Saletan, “KKK vs. KFC,” Slate, accessed April 9, 2014. 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2005/08/kkk_vs_kfc.html 
2 Stephen Smith, “PETA Evaluates Charges of Racism,” CBS News, August 13, 2005.  
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saying, “Black people in America have had quite enough of being compared to animals without 
PETA joining in.”3  Preceding the outrage over the exhibit, PETA previously had apologized 
over a similar campaign featuring images of the Holocaust alongside those of factory farming.  
In both instances, the predominant reaction of the news media, the blogosphere, and even 
scholars, was to demonize the exhibits, calling those who would make such comparisons radical 
or racist.   
It has become abundantly clear in American culture that animal suffering and human 
suffering are not equivalent and those willing to compare the two could be ostracized, censured, 
and perhaps even “branded” racist.  Should it be accepted, then, that oppression of animals and 
humans is too dissimilar to compare? Or perhaps the sacralization in episodes of human 
suffering, such as slavery or the Holocaust, is too profound to be likened to modern 
circumstances of animal suffering.  After all, are they not just animals?  Such objection to 
comparing human and animal suffering is inherently speciesist and not only solidifies an 
anthropocentric ideology, but also limits human awareness in regard to our own responsibility in 
prolonging a culture of oppression.  Quite a lot can be learned about the homogeneity of 
oppression across all groups and species by decentering a humanistic viewpoint in investigating 
oppression.  As I will contend in this chapter, through a comparative analysis of episodes of 
oppression, both human and animal, certain consistencies emerge, enabling the development of a 
general theory of oppression.  The purpose of establishing a theory explaining the historical 
uniformity of oppression is paramount in the context of this work on the animal victims of 
human dominion.  In showing the similarities, not only between the human and animal victims of 
oppression, but also in the forces contributing to their victimization, the paradoxes of a recurring 
3 Smith, “PETA Evaluates Charges of Racism.” 
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culture of oppression can be challenged, the human—animal divide can be minimized, and 
perhaps the light of moral consciousness can be extended to the shadows. 
 With a comparative analysis focusing on women, persons of color, and animals as 
victims of oppression, my theoretical basis for this chapter centers on a four-phase progression of 
oppression.  The first phase, or the antecedent principle as I will call it, affirms the rise of 
dominion through principles of capitalism; phase two is the marginalization of the other; phase 
three is isolation of the marginalized; and phase four is exploitation of the isolated.  In 
developing a theory of oppression, it is imperative to establish the origins of dominion in the 
West linking human and animal, but also to highlight oppression as procedural by detailing the 
transition from the establishment of dominion towards the eventuality of episodic oppression.  In 
detailing the uniformity of oppression across boundaries, the occurrence of fundamental 
elements that contribute to the formation of dominion that leads to a state of oppression 
materializes.  What I am suggesting is that the establishment of dominion must precede a state of 
oppression.  If slavery is understood as one instance of oppression, then dominion of one group 
over another had to transpire prior to the actuality of enslavement.  I refer to this as the 
antecedent principle of oppression.4   
 Within this theory of oppression, the antecedent principle signifies connectivity among 
the oppressed groups assessed in this work, in that the oppression of each is only possible 
through the simultaneous rise of a dominant group.  In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris 
Marion Young defines oppression as an injustice and understands the existence of oppression as 
a condition of all groups.5  According to Young, “In its traditional usage, oppression means the 
4 Dominion in the context of this work will be used interchangeably with the term dominant group.  The act of 
oppression itself, as I will contend, is perpetrated by those who dominate the “other.” 
5 Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011), Google 
Play E-book, 52. 
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exercise of tyranny by a ruling group.”6  Yet, as Young points out, the meaning of oppression 
began to shift during the liberal social movements of the 1960s and 1970s.  Young claims, “In its 
new usage, oppression designates the disadvantage and injustice some people suffer not because 
a tyrannical power coerces them, but because of the everyday practices of a well-intentioned 
liberal society.”7  This seems to conflict with my contention that for oppression to occur 
dominion must first be established.  However, whether oppression is recognized in the tyrannical 
sense or from a structural standpoint, both instances reflect dominion, whether this be by a 
dominant group, by an individual exercising tyranny, or by a dominant discourse of ideas that 
advocates oppressing some members within a society.  The oppression of animals, women, and 
blacks qualifies as structural oppression, because engrained ideologies of speciesism, sexism, 
and racism created and upheld dominion over the three groups.  The scholarship of Critical Race 
Theory exemplifies understanding oppression in the structural sense.  Richard Delgado and Jean 
Stefancic explain, 
The movement considers many of the same issues that conventional civil rights and 
ethnic studies discourses take up, but places them in a broader perspective that includes 
economics, history, context, group- and self-interest, and even feelings and the 
unconscious. Unlike traditional civil rights, which embraces incrementalism and step-by-
step progress, critical race theory questions the very foundations of the liberal order, 
including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral 
principles of constitutional law.8 
 
Young reinforces this idea:  
The systemic character of oppression implies than an oppressed group need not have a 
correlate oppressing group.  While structural oppression involves relations among groups, 
these relations do not always fit the paradigm of conscious and intentional oppression of 
6 Young, 52. 
7 Ibid., 53. 
8 Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 2nd edition (New York: New York University Press, 2012), Google Play E-
Book, 3. 
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one group by another.  Foucault (Discipline and Punish, 1977) suggests that to 
understand the meaning and operation of power in modern society we must look beyond 
the model of power as “sovereignty,” a dyadic relation of ruler and subject, and 
reproducing oppression, but those people are usually simply doing their jobs or living 
their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression.9   
 
Herein lies the importance of the antecedent principle of oppression, especially in Western 
society, where a culture of oppression is replicated by the original ideology for which dominion 
forms, that is, by the establishment of a dominant race, species, religion, or gender. 
 The establishment of dominion in the West and its continuity in the oppression of 
animals, women, and blacks derives primarily from an economic need grafted onto a deep-rooted 
belief system.  As Marxist theory contends, social relationships are embedded in economic forms 
of production.  In a capitalist society, these relationships are often based on exploitation, as the 
ruling class extracts for its benefit the surplus value of another’s labor.10  In the article “Can 
Marxism Explain America’s Racism,” Sidney Willhelm writes,  
Such treatment of labor is a form of economic exploitation because any value in excess of 
production costs accrues to business owners rather than to the workers. Upon this 
fundamental economic principle, a specific form of class system emerges with divergent 
and incompatible economic imperatives: the upper (or ruling capitalist) class focuses 
upon production to extract profits from labor; the working (or proletariat) class 
necessarily copes with working conditions and the scale of pay in the form of wages.11 
 
Through the establishment of a ruling class (a dominant group) capitalism has developed and 
sustained a structural system of oppression on the workers, whether this be from the origins of 
slavery in America to modern methods of enslavement in the factory farm.  Sociological theories 
on minority groups traditionally have viewed dominant groups within a society as typical or 
9 Young, 53-54. 
10 Sidney Willhelm, “Can Marxism Explain America’s Racism,” Social Problems 28, no. 2 (December 1980): 98, 
accessed April 10, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/800145 
11 Ibid. 
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“normal” members and minorities as distinct or foreign and have downplayed the significance of 
structural oppressive agents.12  Yet, as David Nibert contends in his book Animal Rights/Human 
Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation, the term minority group should be 
replaced with a term that is more forthright, “oppressed groups.”13  According to Nibert, “The 
term oppressed group [italics original] is not only more appropriate and honest but also avoids 
the human-centered concept of minority groups and helps challenge the prevailing view that 
human use and mistreatment of other animals lies in the realm of ‘natural affairs.’”14  While a 
capitalist mentality has been paramount in the continuance of a culture of oppression, deeply 
embedded non-economic beliefs and practices also have been prominent in the establishment of 
dominion and the designation of oppressed groups.   
 One such belief arising from eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinking and deeply 
rooted in the ideological positioning of the other, relegated women and persons of color as less 
than “human” on the basis of their lacking reason or rationality in comparison to white men.  It 
is the idea of inferiority that scholars enforce such as eighteenth- century thinkers David Hume, 
Voltaire, and Immanuel Kant.  Hume wrote in a 1748 essay,   
I am apt to suspect the Negroes, and in general all other species of men, to be naturally 
inferior to the whites.  There never was any civilized nation of any other complection 
[sic] than white. . . . No ingenious manufactures among them, no arts, no sciences. . . . 
Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, 
if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men.15 
  
12 David Nibert, Animal Rights/Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 5, accessed February 2, 2014. Kindle Electronic Edition.  
13 Ibid., 6. 
14 Ibid. 
15 David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), 629-
630.  
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Voltaire, in common with Hume, wrote of the inferiority of black humans when he contended in 
his 1756 essay:  
Their eyes are not formed like ours. The black wool on their heads and other parts has no 
resemblance to our hair; and it may be said that if their understanding is not of a different 
nature from ours, it is at least greatly inferior. They are not capable of any great 
application or association of ideas, and seem formed neither for the advantages nor 
abuses of our philosophy. They are a race peculiar to that part of Africa, the same as 
elephants and monkeys.”16   
 
Likewise, Kant in 1764 substantiated the contentions of Hume and Voltaire:  “The Negroes of 
Africa have received from nature no intelligence that rises above the foolish.  The difference 
between the two races is thus a substantial one: it appears to be just as great in respect to the 
faculties of the mind as in color. . . .  Hume invites anyone to quote a single example of a Negro 
who has exhibited talents.”17  
A similar perspective on the inferiority of women prevailed among the “great thinkers of 
the Enlightenment,” notably Jean Jacques Rousseau and Kant.  Rousseau claimed, 
The needle and the sword cannot be wielded by the same hands. If I were sovereign, I 
would permit sewing and the needle trades only to women and to cripples reduced to 
occupations like theirs. . . . Why are they not satisfied by those made by nature, with 
those crowds of cowardly men whose heart it has mutilated? The delicate and fearful man 
is condemned by nature to a sedentary life. He is made to live with women or in their 
manner. . . . How can men not be ashamed to encroach on those that women do?18 
 
Rousseau not only saw women’s position as inferior, he also inscribed in Èmile (On Education) 
that although women possess “quick wit,” they lack creativity, the ability to reason abstractly, or 
possess genius.  Rousseau contended that women’s education should prepare them for 
16 Voltaire, The Works of Voltaire, critique and biography by John Morley, notes by Tobias Smollett, trans. William 
F. Fleming (New York: E.R. DuMont, 1901), 162.   
17 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. John T. Goldthwait (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1991), 55. 
18 Jean Jacques Rousseau, On Education (1918), quoted in Paul Thomas, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Sexist?” Feminist 
Studies 17, no. 2 (Summer, 1991): 195, accessed April 10, 2014.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/3178331 
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domesticity as a wife or mother.19  Although Kant’s dialogue on women’s rationality is 
sometimes unclear, he posited that women, like men, possessed rationality but often were 
inhibited from exercising it.20  Kant contended, “Woman’s nature is identified with inclination, 
and it would appear that in the kingdom of rational beings there are only adult males.”21  Such 
presumptions held by leading thinkers of the dominant group ultimately instituted and reinforced 
the patriarchal and paternal nature of Western thought. 
 The Enlightenment also perpetuated the anthropocentric ideology still prevalent within 
Western society today.  Many scholars contend that racism was born out of the Enlightenment, 
but that the depreciated status of animals conveyed through Cartesian dialogue set the tone for 
the Enlightenment.22  Although Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire and Rousseau upgraded 
the status of animals from the insentient mechanical creatures that Descartes concluded they 
were to a higher form of life, most Enlightenment thinkers still divided the human from animal, 
similar to the chasm between white and black and man and woman. 
 The viewpoints that contributed to the shaping of governments and the founding of 
academic disciplines and social institutions contributed to the formation of an adverse category 
19 Thomas, 198. 
20 As I understand, contemporary views on Kant’s writings about women’s cognitive capacities are often 
misconstrued by scholars. His position is more of a reflection of his understanding that society has conditioned 
women’s role, rather than that of biological inferiority.  
21 Kant, Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime, 85. 
22 Philosopher and historian Justin Smith, postmodernist Jacques Derrida, postcolonial philosopher Emmanuel 
Chukwudi Eze, cultural historian George Mosse, and leading critical race theorist David Goldberg, among many 
other late twentieth and early twenty-first century scholars, held the Enlightenment thinkers responsible for the 
creation of race and therefore point to the era itself as responsible for the birth of racism.  In a February 10, 2013, 
New York Times essay, “The Enlightenment’s ‘Race’ Problem, and Ours,” Justin Smith writes, “The question for us 
today is why we have chosen to stick with categories inherited from the 18th century, the century of the so-called 
Enlightenment, which witnessed the development of the slave trade into the very foundation of the global 
economy, and at the same time saw racial classifications congeal into pseudo-biological kinds, piggy-backing on the 
divisions folk science had always made across the natural world of plants and animals. Why, that is, have we 
chosen to go with Hume and Kant, rather than with the pre-racial conception of humanity espoused by Kraus, or 
the anti-racial picture that Herder offered in opposition to his contemporaries?”  See Justin Smith’s New York 
Times article from February 10, 2013 at http://nytimes.com/2013/02/10/why-has-race-
survived/?_php=true&_type=blogs&ref=opinion&_r=0 
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of “other”, a social construct specified by a position of obscurity and vulnerability.  Taking 
advantage of this vulnerability constitutes, essentially, the origin of oppression.  In Justice and 
the Politics of Difference, Young divides oppression into five categories, which she terms the 
five distinct faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural 
imperialism, and violence.23  The theory of oppression that I propose differs from Young’s 
suggestions on several notable points.  First, Young examines oppression only as it relates to 
humans.  She does not explicitly exclude non-human animals, but makes no mention of them as 
victims of individual acts of tyranny or victims within structural oppression.  Second, although 
Young recognizes different and distinct patterns or occurrences of oppression, she nonetheless 
finds the cohesiveness in these patterns to be embedded in an overlying system of institutional or 
structural oppression.  Alternatively, I find the cohesiveness of the occurrences of oppression to 
be procedural, rather than structural.  This is not to say that structural oppression is absent but 
rather that it differs in kind due to a pattern of progression, or in regard to how oppression 
proceeds from one stage to another.   
 The theoretical framework of oppression traces the rise of a dominant group in Western 
society by way of the establishment of dominion (the antecedent principle of oppression).  Once 
dominion is established within a society, what follows in a pattern of oppression are 
marginalization, isolation, and exploitation.  Marginalization, essentially, is the removal of a 
group to the margins of society that thus creates a category of other.  According to Young, 
marginalization occurs when, “A whole category of people is expelled from useful participation 
in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe material deprivation and even 
extermination.”24  Marginalization effectively lessens the status of a group of humans or even a 
23 Young, 53. 
24 Ibid., 65. 
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group of animals by excluding them from equal benefits to others within a society.25  In 
advanced capitalist societies, Young contends that marginality represents two categories of 
injustice:  “First, the provision of welfare itself produces new injustice by depriving those 
dependent on it of rights and freedoms that others have. Second. . . . marginalization is unjust 
because it blocks the opportunity to exercise capacities in socially defined and recognized 
ways.”26  This is a fundamentally humanistic explanation of marginalization, but it can be 
applied to non-human animals as well.  Relegating non-human animals to a lesser status denies 
them the ability to exercise their innate capacities, those naturally found characteristics within 
both human and nonhuman animals, such as a desire for freedom or a preference for pleasure 
instead of pain.  Thus, marginalization arises from the establishment of dominion.  Once a 
dominant group emerges, those outside of the group become marginal.  Racism derives from the 
Enlightenment idea of the superiority of one group (whites) over others (those of color).  The 
superior group dominates the inferior because the latter “lacks” preferred traits found in the 
former.  In this sense, oppression is very much a process, as the rise of the dominant group 
creates a societal hierarchy that places the dominant group atop. 
 Although marginalization is indeed a facet of oppression, I suggest that it is an initial 
phase of oppression.  As the white human male assumed dominion through the dissemination 
and acceptance in the West of Enlightenment ideas of his possession of traits (e.g. reason, control 
of emotions).  Women, persons of color, and animals thus were positioned outside of the social 
contract, effectively becoming marginal to the white human male and forming the other.  Once 
marginalized, they then could be isolated.  Through a set of essential oppressive structures 
consistent in western culture, isolation proceeds.  Isolation of the marginal can take two forms, 
25 Young, 65. 
26 Ibid. 
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physical isolation, as in bodily placement outside or away from concentrated groups of people, 
and cognitive isolation, which separates the marginalized from the consciousness of society.  
Marginalizing a group distinguishes the group as different and inferior, while isolation builds 
barriers to keep the groups in a place of submissiveness.  In Young’s discussion of structural 
oppression, isolation can be seen as a contributing factor not only in the continuance and 
establishment of structural oppression in Western society over time, but also in procedural 
oppression that eventually leads to exploitation.  Isolation confirms the powerlessness of 
marginalized groups and is the central barrier that preserves classes of other as marginal.  
According to Young, “The powerless are those who lack authority or power even in this 
mediated sense, those over whom power is exercised without their exercising it; the powerless 
are situated so that they must take orders and rarely have the right to give them.”27  Of note in 
Young’s description of powerlessness is her use of the word “situated” that she applies to the 
idea of a concrete position within society.  Young’s explanation of powerlessness, as I suggest, 
in part is based on the establishment of dominion and the creation of the other and emphasized 
through isolation.   
 A central feature of isolating a subservient human group is to dehumanize it.  In 
“Dehumanization: An Integrative Review,” Nick Haslam defines dehumanization, in part, as a 
process of moral exclusion that denies individuals identity and community.28  Denying identity 
removes the perception of a person as an independent, distinguishable individual with a capacity 
to make choices.29  Denying the human and nonhuman animal of community excludes each from 
27 Young, 68. 
28 Personality and Social Psychology Review 10, no. 3 (2006): 253, accessed April 12, 2014.  
http://general.utpb.edu/FAC/hughes_j/Haslam%20on%20dehumanization.pdfIs  
29 Ibid. 
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the moral community or of an “interconnected network of individuals who care for each other.”30  
According to Haslam, “When people are divested of these agentic and communal aspects of 
humanness they are deindividuated, lose the capacity to evoke compassion and moral emotions, 
and may be treated as means toward vicious ends.”31  Dehumanization is an inherently 
anthropocentric term because in dehumanizing, it is assumed that status is relegated to one less 
than human or to that of an animal.  Dehumanizing essentially means to relegate one to a status 
of animal.  According to Haslam, “A consistent theme in this work is the likening of people to 
animals.  In racist descriptions Africans are compared to apes and sometimes explicitly denied 
membership of the human species.”32  As Yehuda Bauer claims, the comparisons to animals 
through Nazi propaganda in the Holocaust portrayed Jews as: “vermin, rats, or other noxious 
elements from the insect or animal world.”33  Women also are dehumanized, but by men, often 
in regard to their sexuality.  According to Haslam,  
Dehumanization is commonly discussed in feminist writings on the representation of 
women in pornography.  Pornography is said to dehumanize women by representing 
them in an objectified fashion, by implication removing women from full moral 
consideration and legitimating rape and victimization. . . . According to Ortner (1974), 
women are pan-culturally ‘seen as representing a lower order of being, as being less 
transcendental of nature than men,’ and femaleness is equated with animality, nature, and 
childlikeness.34 
 
The dehumanization of persons of color and women all share a linkage to the objectification of 
animals.  All are denied status of subject, perhaps by the dominant group (males) focusing on a 
portion of their bodies or only on their sexuality and, instead, they become objects that then can 
30 Haslam, 253. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 252. 
33 Yehuda Bauer, “Genocide: Was It the Nazis' Original Plan?” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 450 (July 1980): 37, accessed April 12, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1042557 
34 Haslam, 253.  
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be exploited for society’s gain.  Isolation by means of objectification or dehumanization is 
essentially the barrier that keeps certain groups within a culture of oppression in a place of 
submissiveness.  This assures that the status quo will not be challenged. 
 Through marginalization and isolation, exploitation as a process of oppression can then 
proceed.  In Western cultures, exploitation often uses capitalism to oppress.   According to 
Young, in respect to Marx’s theory of exploitation,  
The injustice of capitalist society consists in the fact that some people exercise their 
capacities under the control, according to the purposes, and for the benefit of other 
people. Through private ownership of the means of production, and through markets that 
allocate labor and the ability to buy goods, capitalism systematically transfers the powers 
of some persons to others, thereby augmenting the power of the latter.35 
 
 
The contention here is that in the capitalist system, the capitalist holds the power to extract 
benefits from the workers, thereby exploiting them.36  Similarly, it must be acknowledged that 
slavery, unequal pay for women, and factory farming are consistent within a capitalist system 
and all constitute instances of exploitation.   
It is also notable that exploitation is an all-encompassing form of oppression that Robert 
Goodin defines by s-exploitation (situational) and p-exploitation (person).37 According to Robert 
Mayer’s explanation of Goodin’s theory, “All cases of exploitation are instances of situation-
exploitation in which agents turn some favorable circumstance in their situation or environment 
to their advantage.”38 Person-exploitation involves a person or group gaining at the expense of 
another and the wrongness of p-exploitation is founded on the emphasis of human obligation to 
35 Young, 60. 
36 Ibid., 60-62. 
37 Robert Goodin, “Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person,” in Modern Theories of Exploitation, ed. Andrew 
Reeve (London: Sage Publications, 1987), 171-178.  
38 Robert Mayer, “A Walzerian Theory of Exploitation,” Polity 34, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 339, accessed April 12, 2014.  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3235395 
25 
 
                                                          
others based in part on the vulnerabilities of the exploited person (or in our case a human person 
or an animal).39  Mayer writes,  
P-exploitation only occurs in exchange relationships or bilateral transactions. . . . The 
characteristic indicator of an exploitative transaction is disproportionality in the 
distribution of benefits and burdens: the exploited assume disproportionate burdens for 
the benefit received, while exploiters gain much at little cost. . . . Those who exploit 
others take advantage of an initial inequality, which they ought not to do. As a result, the 
exploited get less than they should from the exchange. Fairness is only achieved when the 
contending parties are made equal, by eliminating the illegitimate advantages.40 
 
A key element of Goodin’s theory of exploitation is that people have a moral obligation to 
protect the vulnerable, but their exploitation of the other acts in opposition to this because, by 
definition, exploitative acts use the vulnerabilities of others to gain benefits for some.41  In my 
theory of oppression, it is the marginalization and isolation of certain humans and animals that 
establishes these vulnerabilities.  Exploitation occurs when people choose to act on these 
vulnerabilities.  The vulnerabilities of animals, women, and persons of color link first and 
foremost to their places outside of the dominant group.  The attribution of a lesser status 
reinforces the marginal group’s place outside of the dominant group and the marginal group’s 
lowered status reinforces their isolation and inferiority.  When the dominant exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the marginal, oppression by means of exploitation is the result.   
 The dominant group’s marginalization and isolation of a group escalates the other’s 
vulnerability, minimizing their power and autonomy.  Exploitation stands as the exhibition of 
power and control of one group over the marginalized and isolated human and animal body.  
Slavery, factory farming, and pornography all stand as manifestations of control over the 
oppressed body.  The white human male’s seizure of power over those outside of the dominant 
39 Mayer, 339-340. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Goodin, “Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person,” 172-173. 
26 
 
                                                          
group established dominion and led to the marginalization of women, blacks, and animals.  
Dehumanization and objectification intensify the divide between the dominant and marginal 
groups and solidifies their isolation as other.  Once made vulnerable by the dominant group, 
persons of color were exploited for their labor through enslavement; women were/are exploited 
through their subservience in marriage and low wages in the work place; and animals were/are 
exploited as commodities in factory farming, vivisection, and hunting.  The marginalization and 
isolation of these groups also appropriate them not only for exploitation, but also for violence, a 
constant element of their exploitation and vulnerability.  If the wrongfulness of exploitation is 
indeed due to the violation of a moral obligation to protect the vulnerable, what is it that the 
vulnerable all share that warrants such an obligation?  Suffering.  This suffering will be explored 
in greater depth through an examination of the industrialization of oppression in the 
slaughterhouse and factory farm.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF MURDER AND THE FACTORY FARM 
 
In relation to them, all people are Nazis: for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka. 
 
- Isaac Bashevis Singer, The Letter Writer 
 
 
Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel The Jungle depicts the struggles of a fictional family of 
Lithuanian workers in Chicago at the turn of the twentieth century.  Although Sinclair’s intention 
was to portray the plight of immigrant workers within the American capitalist economy through 
the point of view of the novel’s protagonist Jurgis Rudkus, The Jungle offered readers an initial 
glimpse into the horrors of the slaughterhouse.  In one particular scene, Sinclair detailed the 
automation, efficiency, and cruelty exhibited in the slaughterhouse at the turn of the twentieth-
century: 
 They had chains which they fastened about the leg of the nearest hog, and the other end 
of the chain they hooked into one of the rings upon the wheel. So, as the wheel turned, a 
hog was suddenly jerked off his feet and borne aloft. At the same instant the ear was 
assailed by a most terrifying shriek. . . . The shriek was followed by another, louder and 
yet more agonizing--for once started upon that journey, the hog never came back; at the 
top of the wheel he was shunted off upon a trolley and went sailing down the room. And 
meantime another was swung up, and then another, and another, until there was a double 
line of them, each dangling by a foot and kicking in frenzy--and squealing. The uproar 
was appalling, perilous to the ear-drums; one feared there was too much sound for the 
room to hold--that the walls must give way or the ceiling crack. There were high squeals 
and low squeals, grunts, and wails of agony; there would come a momentary lull, and 
then a fresh outburst, louder than ever, surging up to a deafening climax. . . . Meantime, 
heedless of all these things, the men upon the floor were going about their work. Neither 
squeals of hogs nor tears of visitors made any difference to them; one by one they hooked 
up the hogs, and one by one with a swift stroke they slit their throats. There was a long 
line of hogs, with squeals and life-blood ebbing away together; until at last each started 
again, and vanished with a splash into a huge vat of boiling water. It was all so very 
businesslike that one watched it fascinated. It was pork-making by machinery, pork-
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making by applied mathematics. And yet somehow the most matter-of-fact person could 
not help thinking of the hogs; they were so innocent, they came so very trustingly; and 
they were so very human in their protests--and so perfectly within their rights! They had 
done nothing to deserve it; and it was adding insult to injury, as the thing was done here, 
swinging them up in this cold-blooded, impersonal way, without a pretence at apology, 
without the homage of a tear. Now and then a visitor wept, to be sure; but this 
slaughtering-machine ran on, visitors or no visitors. It was like some horrible crime 
committed in a dungeon, all unseen and unheeded, buried out of sight and of memory.1  
   
The Jungle originally appeared as a series of installments in the socialist newspaper The 
Appeal to Reason and quickly gained notoriety as a large number of readers requested the 
installments in book form.2  Fearing repercussions from the powerful meat industry, most 
publishers shied away from publishing the book.  However, New York’s Doubleday, Page, and 
Company decided the potential earnings of the book were worth the risk.  According to Charles 
Patterson in Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, “To protect itself 
against possible lawsuits, Doubleday sent one of its own editors, Isaac Marcosson, to Chicago to 
check out the accuracy of Sinclair’s descriptions.”3  Marcosson confirmed Sinclair’s account, 
later stating, “I was able to get a Meat Inspector’s badge, which gave me access to the secret 
confines of the meat empire. . . . Day and night I prowled over its foul-smelling domain and I 
was able to see with my own eyes much that Sinclair had never even heard about.”4   
 Perhaps no other western practice has contributed so profoundly to animal suffering and 
death than the factory farm and slaughterhouse.  As outlined by Sinclair in his critique of 
capitalism, the slaughterhouse stands as a capitalist model for the efficiency and automation of 
slaughter.  The efficiency and automation of murder is central to Charles Patterson’s Eternal 
1 Upton Sinclair, The Jungle, Literary Touchstone Edition (Clayton, Delaware: Prestwick House, 2005), 40-41. 
2 Charles Patterson, Eternal Treblinka (New York: Lantern Books, 2002), 57, accessed May 10, 2014, Google Play E-
Book. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 58. 
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Treblinka, wherein he examines the parallels between the atrocities committed against the human 
victims of the Holocaust and the animal victim of human dominion.  Patterson divides his 
discussion of the comparisons between the Holocaust and modern society’s oppression of 
animals into two major parts.  The first half details the establishment of the human as the master 
species and connects this idea to the Nazi concept of a master race.  The second half traces the 
industrialization of slaughter, both in the system implemented in the Holocaust through the Nazi 
death camps, as well as in the modern factory farm and slaughterhouse.  According to Patterson, 
“The philosopher Theodor Adorno (1903-69), a German Jew who was forced into exile by the 
Nazis. . . .wrote, ‘Auschwitz begins wherever someone looks at a slaughterhouse and thinks: 
they’re only animals.’  If Professor Adorno is right. . .the road to Auschwitz begins at the 
slaughterhouse.”5   
 The history of the slaughterhouse and the twentieth-century development of the factory 
farm have been interwoven in the progression of American capitalism. Commercial meatpacking 
began in North America around 1660, with the opening of a warehouse in Springfield, 
Massachusetts.6  These early American meatpacking facilities, Patterson contends, “clubbed, 
stabbed, and hung the pigs upside down to drain.”7  By mid-nineteenth century, pig flesh was the 
most common “meat” in America and Cincinnati was home to the country’s booming pork 
industry; in 1844 the city had 26 slaughterhouses, just three years later the number had grown to 
40.8  The methods utilized to end the pigs’ life consisted of beating them into submission with 
clubs before slitting their throat.9  Patterson contends, “The rough way Americans treated farm 
animals made an impression on new European immigrants.  One Dutchman wrote back to his 
5 Patterson, 52.  
6 Ibid., 53-54. 
7 Ibid., 54.   
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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friends in the Netherlands that American farmers had no regard for their animals.”10  By 1850, 
the organization of labor became a staple of the meat packaging industry as larger plants began 
coupling their slaughter and packing operations.11  From 1850 until the 1860s, another shift 
occurred as Chicago replaced Cincinnati as the new “slaughter capital of America,” a result of its 
many railroad lines, as well as the opening of the Union Stock Yards.  The Union Stock Yards 
consisted of 2,300 interlocked livestock pens, making it the largest of its kind in the world.12  As 
Patterson details, “By 1886. . .with trains every day unloading hundreds of cars full of western 
longhorn cattle, sheep, and pigs into the Yards’ vast network of pens.  In order to handle the 
growing volume of livestock transported on rail lines. . . .meatpackers introduced the conveyor 
belt to increase the speed and efficiency of the nation’s first mass-production industry.”13  Less 
than a decade before publication of Sinclair’s controversial work on the slaughterhouse, Union 
Stock Yards during its existence had slaughtered nearly 400 million animals.14  
 Patterson contends that the differences in the practice of the slaughter of animals 
“between the early 1900s and today mostly have to do with much faster line speeds and a 
tremendous increase in volume.”15  In fact, as Patterson writes, “Today, what one activist 
describes as the ‘cruel, fast, tightly run, profit-driven system of torture and murder in which 
animals are hardly thought of as living beings. . . .kills more animals in a single day than all the 
slaughterhouses in Sinclair’s day killed in a year.”16  The fundamental operations of “assembly-
line” slaughter today actually are not all that different from the process used 100 years ago.   
10 Patterson, 54.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 55. 
13 Ibid., 55-56. 
14 Ibid., 56. 
15 Ibid., 62. 
16 Patterson, 62. 
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The continuity of assembly-line slaughter, now stretching over more than a century, can 
be explained through the popularity and resilience of Fordism.  Patterson writes, “In his 
autobiography, My Life and Work (1922), Ford revealed that his inspiration for assembly-line 
production came from a visit he made as a young man to a Chicago slaughterhouse.”17  Henry 
Ford’s glimpse into the efficiency of slaughter and dismemberment sparked a monumental 
change in the American economic system of production.  Fordism applied the techniques of the 
early-twentieth century slaughterhouse to implement a system of mechanized mass production 
that relied on the foundational principles of standardization and mechanization.  According to 
Heery and Noon,  
His [Ford] production system was characterized by several important features: linear 
work sequencing, an interdependence of tasks, a moving assembly line, the use and 
refinement of dedicated machinery, and specialized machine tools. . . . Fordism is geared 
towards mass production, which depends upon mass consumption. Changes in patterns of 
consumption would therefore require changes in the work organization or else render 
Fordist production inappropriate.18 
 
The Fordist production system sought maximum throughput in factories and depended on the 
logistics of each factory.  According to Jonathan Rees, “While sometimes defined as the 
productivity of a factory, throughput is actually a measure of the speed and volume of the flow of 
goods through the production process. . . . Starting in the 1880s, inventors developed new 
machinery like conveyors and rollers, which made production through a continuous process 
possible.”19 The use of the assembly line in the Ford Motor Company’s factories revolutionized 
the American production system; moreover, its ability to maximize efficiency guaranteed the 
implementation of Fordism anywhere efficiency was sought.   
17 Ibid., 70. 
18 Edmund Heery and Mike Noon, “Fordism,” In A Dictionary of Human Resource Management. 2nd revised 
edition. Oxford University Press, 2008. Accessed June 10, 2014. http://www.oxfordreference.com. 
19 Jonathan Rees, Industrialization and the Transformation of American Life (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2013), 
113. 
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Although Fordism helped stretch the industrialization of production, it borrowed greatly 
from production methods established by Frederick Winslow Taylor.  In his 1911 book The 
Principles of Scientific Management, Taylor theorized the importance of conserving the strength 
of the worker by minimizing his/her bodily movement, and thus increasing work efficiency.20  
Rees writes, “Ending that waste of motion, Taylor thought, would obviously benefit 
management, but also it would create what he called ‘first-class men,’  efficient employees who 
would then be able to keep more of the benefit of that efficiency for themselves, thereby 
mitigating the negative effects of industrialization on those workers.”21  Taylor studied the 
operations of workers and then broke up their tasks into parts, timing them with a stopwatch in 
order to measure their efficiency.  This allowed him to select the most efficient and organized 
method of labor.22  Another emphasis Taylor recommended was to implement “piece rates,” 
where employees would be paid based on output rather than a consistent wage for the job.23  
Taylor contended that piece work would motivate workers to maximize their output, thus 
increasing their efficiency.  According to Rees, “To determine where the piece rate should be set, 
he made an arbitrary decision as to how fast a normal worker should be going and then set the 
piece rate to reflect that.”24  Rees contends, “The advantage of this system was that if the 
employees met this standard, employers could lower the piece rate and get workers working even 
harder to reach the same rate.”25  This method, known as the speedup, not only pitted workers 
against one another, by putting greater emphasis on one individual’s production, but it also took 
20 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1911), 36. 
21 Rees, 109-110. 
22 Ibid., 110. 
23 Taylor, 36. 
24 Rees, 110-111. 
25 Rees, 111. 
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knowledge away from the employees productive capabilities and gave it to the employers.26  
These principles of efficiency helped to define scientific management and Taylor’s impact on it 
was so profound that the process was—and is—often referred to as Taylorism.27   
Slaughterhouse owners implemented the principles of Fordism and Taylorism to 
maximize the efficiency of slaughterhouses and to increase their output, and heighten and 
intensify the industrialization of slaughter.  These principles, later adopted by the Nazis, not only 
were implemented to conquer most of Europe with the construction of an efficient military, but 
helped lead to the slaughter of millions of Jews in Nazi death camps.  As Patterson notes, “Hitler 
regarded Ford as a comrade-in-arms and kept a life-sized portrait of him on the wall next to his 
desk in his office at the Nazi party headquarters in Munich.”28  Ford was also the only American 
to be mentioned in Mein Kampf, where Hitler praised his endeavors.29  
The same techniques used to exterminate millions of humans in the 1930s and 1940s 
continue to be employed today through similar but perfected and even more efficient techniques 
in the slaughterhouse.  Political artist, animal activist, and author Sue Coe traveled the United 
States for six years visiting slaughterhouses, where she sketched and described what she had 
witnessed. She later documented these encounters in her book Dead Meat.30 Patterson details 
several of Coe’s encounters, but none epitomizes the cruelty and suffering within American 
slaughterhouses more than her recollection of a small family-owned slaughterhouse in 
Pennsylvania:  
She enters the facility shortly before the lunch break: ‘We step into a large room, and I 
look up and see corpses of huge, skinned animals. . . .’I definitely do not want to fall in 
all the blood and intestines,’ writes Coe.  ‘The workers are wearing nonslip boots, yellow 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 110. 
28 Patterson, 72-73. 
29 Ibid., 73. 
30 Alexander Cockburn, introduction to Dead Meat by Sue Coe (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1995), 28-31. 
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aprons, and hard hats.  It is a scene of controlled, mechanized, chaos.  Like most 
slaughterhouses, ‘this place is dirty—filthy in fact—flies swarm everywhere.  The walls, 
floors, everything, everywhere are covered with blood.  The chains are caked with dried 
blood.’. . . As she walks onto the kill floor to position herself with her sketchbook in the 
doorway between where the cows are lined up for slaughter and the kill floor, a loud horn 
suddenly sounds and the workers disperse for lunch.  Coe sees something move to her 
right, so she edges closer to the knocking pen to get a better look.  ‘Inside is a cow.  She 
has not been stunned and has slipped and fallen in the blood.  The men have gone to 
lunch and left her.  Time passes.  Occasionally she struggles, banging the sides of the 
steel enclosure with her hooves. . . .Once she raises her head enough to look outside the 
box, but seeing the hanging corpses she falls back again.’  Coe starts drawing, but when 
she looks back at the box, she notices that the weight of the cow’s body has forced milk 
from her udders.  As the milk flows in a small stream toward the drainage area, it mixes 
with blood so they go down the drain together.  One of the injured cow’s legs is sticking 
out of the bottom of the steel enclosure. . . .When the workers return from their lunch 
break, they tie on their yellow aprons and get back to work.  Coe sees a man she hadn’t 
noticed before come in.  He kicks the injured cow hard three or four times to try to get 
her to stand up, but she can’t.  Danny leans over into the box to try to shoot her with his 
compression stunner, which will drive a five-inch bolt into her brain.  When he thinks he 
has good aim at her head, he fires. . . .He goes over to her, chains one of her legs, and 
swings her up.  She struggles, and her legs kick as she swings upside down.  Danny talks 
to the unstunned ones as he slits their throats, ‘Come on girl, take it easy.’31    
 
Coe later wrote of her tour of the slaughterhouses, “This is Dante’s Inferno,’. . . .‘steam, 
noise, blood, smell, and speed.  Sprinklers wash off meat, giant vacuum-packing machines use 
heat to seal twenty-two pieces of flesh a minute.”32  According to Patterson,    
Coe’s reference here to ‘Dante’s Inferno’ brings to mind the reaction of Franz Stangl to 
the Treblinka death camp when he arrived to take up his duties as commandant. . . 
.’Treblinka that day was the most awful thing I saw during all of the Third Reich’—he 
buried his face in his hands—‘it was ‘Dante’s Inferno,’ he said through his fingers. ‘It 
was Dante come to life.  When I entered the camp and got out of the car on the square I 
stepped knee-deep into notes, currency, precious stones, jewelry, clothes.  They were 
everywhere, strewn all over the square.  The smell was indescribable; the hundreds, no, 
the thousands of bodies everywhere, decomposing, putrefying.33 
 
31 Sue Coe, Dead Meat, quoted in Patterson, Eternal Treblinka, 63-65. 
32 Coe, Dead Meat (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1995), 118. 
33 Patterson, 68. 
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 The industrialization of slaughter that treats human and non-human animals alike as 
nothing more than commodities in a system designed for speed and efficiency, links the 
slaughterhouse and the extermination of billions of non-human animals and the extermination of 
millions of humans in the Holocaust.  Patterson claims that the industrialized slaughter of cattle, 
pigs, sheep, and other animals “paved the way, at least indirectly, for the final solution.”34  He 
writes, “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species, our 
victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each 
other.”35  Many Nazi practices were modeled on the practices in the slaughterhouse.  According 
to Patterson, “It is significant that the Nazis treated their victims like animals before they 
murdered them. . . .The Nazis forced those whom they were about to murder to get completely 
undressed and huddle together, something that is not normal behavior for human beings.  
Nakedness suggests an identity as animals; when combined with crowding, it suggests a herd of 
cattle or sheep.”36  Dehumanizing victims made them easy to kill.  Two of the most highly 
industrialized nations of the twentieth century, Germany and the United States, accounted for the 
slaughter of millions of human and nonhuman animals through the American slaughterhouse and 
the German gas chambers.37  
Although the purpose of killing, as well as the identity of the victims differed, both the 
slaughterhouse and gas chamber share certain qualities.  As Patterson contends, the shared 
operations or methodology of industrialized killing in the slaughterhouse and in Nazi death 
camps consists of: (1) streamlining the process, (2) the chute/funnel/tube, (3) processing the sick, 
34 Ibid., 107. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 108. 
37 Ibid. 
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weak, or injured, and (4) the concept of “humane slaughter.”38  Streamlining the process refers to 
the essential elements of speed and efficiency at both American slaughterhouses and Nazi death 
camps.  Patterson elaborates, “At killing centers speed and efficiency are essential for the success 
of the operation.  Just the right mix of deception, intimidation, physical force, and speed is 
needed to minimize the chance of panic or resistance that will disrupt the process.”39  Speed is 
also critical to increase the numbers killed within short periods of time and efficiency suppresses 
the “operator’s” potential for feeling guilt after the fact, or their concern for the victims during 
the act.40  Key elements of streamlining the process, as Patterson claims, make the “acts of mass 
murder as routine, mechanical, repetitive, and programmed as possible.”41      
 In both killing centers, the chute, funnel, or tube stands as the last passage for the human 
or animal before death.  One example of this mechanism, described by Patterson, can be found at 
a facility in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, where “the nearly block-long underground passage used 
to drive livestock from the stockyard to the Morrell meatpacking plant is called the ‘Tunnel of 
Death.’”42  Most slaughterhouses use similar passages to reduce panic, maintain order, and keep 
the process speedy and efficient.  Crucial to Patterson’s analysis, at the Nazi death camps Belzec, 
Sobibor, and Treblinka, “the tube was the final passage that led to the gas chambers, once inside 
the tube, death was imminent.43 
 The sick, weak, or injured “interfere” with the speed and efficiency of the process.44  As 
Patterson details,  
38 Patterson, 108-130.   
39 Ibid., 108.   
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 108-109. 
42 Ibid., 110.   
43 Patterson, 111. 
44 Ibid. 
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Each center has to find ways to deal with those who can’t keep up.  At Treblinka, after a 
camp staff member ordered the new arrivals to turn over their luggage and valuables and 
prepare themselves for the shower. . . .the staff member told the old, the sick, the injured, 
and mothers with babies to go to the ‘infirmary,’ where they would receive medical 
attention.  So while guards drove those designated for gassing to the disrobing area, other 
guards led those destined for the ‘infirmary’ up the path to the execution pit.45  
 
Animals too sick, old, or injured to move quickly through the process are either left behind until 
workers have time to deal with them or they are cast into the “dead pile.”46  One “bitterly ironic” 
feature of killing operations, Patterson writes, “is their [operations] sic attempt to make killing 
more humane.”47 Hitler conveyed the need for humane killing policies and believed it to be more 
humane to kill “defective” children than to let them live.48  In the United States, the 1958 
Humane Slaughter Act, sought to make the slaughter of livestock more humane, stating, 
“animals whose meat is sold to the federal government or its agencies be rendered ‘insensible to 
pain’. . . .before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut.”49 
 The shared qualities of the industrialization of slaughter is emphasized in the title of 
Patterson’s work, taken from the Yiddish writer Isaac Bashevis Singer, who escaped the 
Holocaust in his native Poland to come to the United States.  Treblinka, a Nazi extermination 
camp located in Poland, claimed more lives during the Holocaust than any other death camp, 
except Auschwitz.50  The title derives from Singer’s “The Letter Writer,” wherein he links the 
oppression of animals to the Nazi crimes at the Treblinka extermination camp:  
In his thoughts, Herman spoke a eulogy for the mouse who had shared a portion of her 
life with him and who, because of him, had left this earth.  “What do they know—all 
45 Ibid., 112. 
46 Ibid.,, 112-113. 
47 Ibid., 130. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 132. 
50 Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (London: 
Penguin Books, 2001), 143.   
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these scholars, all these philosophers, all the leaders of the world—about such as you?”  
They have convinced themselves that man, the worst transgressor of all the species, is the 
crown of creation.  All other creatures were created merely to provide him with food, 
pelts, to be tormented exterminated.  In relation to them, all people are Nazis: for the 
animals it is an eternal Treblinka.51 
 
The eternal Treblinka for animals continues today as the interwoven practices of factory 
farming and slaughter have increased as the demand for animal flesh rises.  Such high demand, 
coupled with the desire to increase production, led to a notable shift in the American agricultural 
system in the last half of the twentieth century.  This shift was contingent on the disappearance 
of small and medium-size dairy, cattle, and hog farms, as they were replaced by large scale, 
highly intensive factory farms.52  Similar to the industrial shift seen in the slaughterhouse at the 
turn of the twentieth century, farms became transformed into factories beginning in the 1920s 
and lasting through the 1970s.  As Jim Mason discusses in the introduction to Animal Factories,  
The reality of a modern animal factory stands in sharp contrast to the farm of our 
fantasies. . . . Farms like the one of my childhood are rapidly being replaced by animal 
factories.  Animals are reared in huge buildings, crowded in with cages stacked up like so 
many shipping crates.  On the factory farms there are no pastures, no streams, no seasons, 
not even day and night.  Animal-wise herdsmen and milkmaids have been replaced by 
automated feeders, computers, closed-circuit television, and vacuum pumps.  Health and 
productivity come not from frolics in sunny meadows but from syringes and additive-
laced feed.53 
 
As Deborah Fitzgerald contended in her book Every Farm a Factory, the financial crisis of the 
1980s threw the farming industry into crisis and finalized the transition from farm to factory.54  
Experts offered various explanations for this new farming crisis, but at the time of the financial 
51 Isaac Bashevis Singer, “The Letter Writer,” in The Collected Stories of Isaac Bashevis Singer (New York: Farrar, 
Straus, and Giroux, 1982), 274-275. 
52 Food and Water Watch, “Factory Farm Nation: How America Turned Its Livestock Farms into Factories,” 2010, 
accessed March 4, 2014. http://foodandwater.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/FactoryFarmNation-web.pdf (accessed March 4, 2014), v.  
53 Jim Mason and Peter Singer, Animal Factories (New York: Crown Publishers, 1980), xiii. 
54 Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 1.  
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crisis no one was certain.  What could be agreed upon was the similarity the current crisis shared 
with the farming crash of the 1920s.  As Fitzgerald notes, “The approaches at the time missed a 
fundamental feature of twentieth-century agriculture, and that is the emergence of an industrial 
logic or ideal in agriculture.”55  She explains,  
Beginning in the 1920s, farmers and their families had to contend with a new set of 
opportunities and constraints, most of which grew out of the new industrial production 
systems. These systems, epitomized by the modern mass production factory and 
industrial boardroom, linked capital, raw materials, transportation networks, 
communication systems, and newly trained technical experts. Interconnected and often 
sprawling, these systems of production and consumption functioned like grids into which 
ﬁt the more identiﬁable components of industrialization—the tractors, paved roads, bank 
credit, migrant labor, and commodity markets.56 
 
It was this system, Fitzgerald argues, one reflective of industrialization, first in the 1920s and 
again in the 1980s, that linked farms and farmers in prosperity and crisis.  It aligned them with 
new agents, technologies, and practices.57  Thus, the transformation of the farm to factory, 
cannot be linked to one specific time but happened as part of a gradual process of modernization.   
Following World War II, leaders in business and agriculture suggested that the struggling 
agricultural industry was in need of modernization in order to become more profitable and 
efficient, like the factories that earlier  had adopted the principles of Taylor and Ford.58  
Fitzgerald writes, “Timeliness of operations, large-scale production sites, mechanization, 
standardization of product, specialization, speed of throughput, routinization of the workforce, 
and a belief that success was based ﬁrst and foremost upon a notion of “efﬁciency”—all these 
principles were drawn directly from the factories and businesses only recently declared 
55 Ibid., 3. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 4-5. 
58 Fitzgerald, 5. 
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successful.”59  For famers this meant following a model that by now had been proven successful.  
Fitzgerald explains, “Henry Ford’s production facilities, for instance, stood as a dramatic 
example of the efﬁcacy of rational management techniques, which many felt should now be 
applied to farming. As an International Harvester promotion exhorted [by 1920], ‘Every Farm a 
Factory.’”60 
Although the industrialization of slaughterhouses progressed rapidly, the industrialization 
of the farm constituted more of a gradual process though three prominent eras of industrialization 
that transformed the local farm from small plots of crops and pastures, to the highly intensive, 
mechanized, and efficient methods seen today in factory farms.  Fitzgerald points to the years 
following World War I, the decade following World War II, and the 1970s, as the three major 
eras of industrialization that witnessed the farm undergo its greatest transformations.61  Leading 
up to World War I, the success of the modern factory system was evident and Ford’s Highland 
Park and River Rouge factories stood as the example.   As Fitzgerald notes,  
Here the various components of modern factory production, of industrialization, came 
together in dramatic display. This system encompassed not only the physical handling of 
materials, the moving assembly line, and the mechanization of small tasks, but also the 
unprecedented managerial interest in workers’ personal lives and the aggressive attempt 
to mold each worker into a perfect, Americanized cog in the Fordist machine.62        
 
As industrialization transformed the operations inside the factory through the applied 
principles of Taylorism and Fordism, American culture felt the change.  Fitzgerald explains, 
“Taylor and Ford were only the most obvious examples of the sea change occurring in America 
in the years leading up to World War I. In businesses, schools, homes, government ofﬁces, 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 5-9. 
62 Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory, 27. 
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factories, cities, and towns, even in the arts, the unmistakable trajectory was from the chaotic to 
the controlled, from loose to tight, from spontaneous to planned, from curved to straight.”63  
Although the American agricultural system at first proved resilient to major change, as World 
War I came to an end very few farms remained untouched by industrialization.64 According to 
Fitzgerald, “As the war began to recede from view, it became apparent that the agricultural 
system was in serious disrepair. No longer could one speak of a few desultory farmers who 
lacked ability; now even good farmers were caught in the industrial web.”65  Over the next 50 
years the transformation of farm to factory would become complete and it would be the animals 
who would pay the greatest price for human “advancement.” 
 In the 1970s, another era of industrialization took hold in the American agricultural 
system as modernization and new technological advances allowed for the animal body to be 
manipulated and standardized, much like the machinery driving Ford’s assembly lines.  As 
Mason and Singer note, “Constant manipulations of animals’ anatomy, physiology, heredity, and 
environment are required to keep health problems and other costs down so that commodity 
production can proceed at a profitable level.66  The status of these factory animals as 
commodities was apparent in the trade journals of the time.  The March 1978 edition of National 
Hog Farmer instructed, “The breeding sow should be thought of, and treated as, a valuable piece 
of machinery whose function is to pump out baby pigs like a sausage machine.”67  One entry in 
the March 1976 issue of Farm Journal in a reference to pigs’ states, “They can still eat—total 
63 Ibid., 28.   
64 Ibid., 29. 
65 Ibid.  For additional information on changes in American agriculture that favored large producers, see also 
Gilbert Fite, “Great Plains Farming: A Century of Change and Adjustment,” Agricultural History 51, no. 1 (January 
1977): 244-56; Fred Shannon, The Farmer’s Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989); 
and Paul Conkin, A Revolution Down on the Farm: The Transformation of American Agriculture since 1929 
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009). 
 
66 Mason and Singer, 35. 
67 L. J. Taylor, National Hog Farmer (March 1978) 6: 27, quoted in Mason and Singer, Animal Factories, 35. 
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darkness has no effect on their appetites.”68  In January 1976, the Farm Journal suggested, 
“Estrus control will open the doors to factory hog production.  Control of female cycles is the 
missing link to the assembly-line approach.”69  Yet another entry in Hog Farm Management in 
1976 read: “Forget the pig is an animal.  Treat him just like a machine in a factory.  Schedule 
treatments like you would lubrication.  Breeding season like the first step in an assembly line.  
And marketing like the delivery of finished goods.”70   
Despite the ongoing shift in the American agricultural system, it was not until 1997 that 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) first recognized factory farms.  In 1997, 
through data provided in the Census of Agriculture, the USDA defined factory farms as 
operations consisting of at least 500 beef cattle, 500 dairy cows, and 1,000 hogs on a single 
feedlot.  For chickens, the criterion was 100,000 egg-laying chickens and 500,000 broiler 
chickens housed in a single location.71  During the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
another trend became evident: livestock numbers within individual factory farms were increasing  
at alarming rates.  An analysis conducted by the Food & Water Watch from 2002 to 2007, found 
livestock numbers on the largest American factory farms increased by 20 percent; from 1997 to 
2007, cows on factory dairy farms doubled in population.  In fact, every species of livestock in 
intensive farming practices increased over the 10-year period.72  The report by the Food & Water 
Watch attributes the substantial growth from 1997 to 2007 of the factory farm to three factors: 
(1) Misguided farm policy encouraged over-production of commodity crops such as corn and 
68 Harry Sterkel Jr., “Cut Light and Clamp Down on Tail Biting,” Farm Journal (March 1976): 6, quoted in Mason and 
Singer, Animal Factories, 118. 
69 Earl Ainsworth, “Revolution in Livestock Breeding on the Way,” Farm Journal (January 1976): 36, quoted in 
Mason and Singer, Animal Factories, 19. 
70 J. Byrnes, “Raising Pigs by the Calendar at Maplewood Farm,” Hog Farm Management (September 1976): 30, 
quoted in Mason and Singer, Animal Factories, 1. 
71 Food and Water Watch, v. 
72 Ibid. 
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soybeans that artificially depressed the price of livestock feed and created an indirect subsidy to 
factory farm operations; (2) a lack of interference in the mergers and acquisitions of the largest 
agribusinesses encouraged other factory farms to grow in order to stay competitive; (3) and loose 
environmental rules failed to hold factory farms responsible for the pollution that was a product 
of intensive agricultural practices.73   
The substantial growth of the factory farm, both in the number of farms and in livestock 
population, had a profound impact on the environment and individual animal species.  A 2009 
USDA report found that almost nine billion animals were slaughtered in the United States alone, 
the vast majority residents of factory farms.  The nearly nine billion animals includes: 
approximately 33 million cattle, one million calves, 114 million hogs, 2.5 million sheep, 8.5 
billion chickens, 240 million turkey, and 23 million duck.74  For the animals, there is usually just 
one exit from the factory farm, death, whether by disease or malnutrition or by slaughter.  Life 
inside the factory farm is characterized by overcrowding, a lack of natural light, and unsanitary 
living conditions.75  The quality of the animal’s life is also degraded due to an unnatural diet and 
by the frequent administering of antibiotics and growth hormones.76  According to Jim Mason 
and Peter Singer, “Even if feed is properly formulated, some animals get inadequate diets.  At 
the feed mill, nutrients are added in amounts according to what the ‘average’ animal needs.  
Because of stress or individual differences, some animals need more of an essential nutrient than 
73 Ibid. 
74 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics Board, Poultry Slaughter Summary, Pou 2-1 (10), 
(Washington, D.C.: National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2010), 12, accessed April 2, 2013. 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/nass/PoulSlauSu//2010s/2010/PoulSlauSu-02-25-2010.pdf, and   
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statics Board, Livestock Slaughter Summary,  Mt An 1-2 -1 (10),  
(Washington, D.C.: National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2010), 3, accessed April 2, 
20http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/nass/LiveSlauSu//2010s/2010/LiveSlauSu-04-29-2010.pdf  
75 Food and Water Watch, 26.   
76 Ibid. 
44 
 
                                                          
they get.”77  Nutritional deficiencies are common and can cause ailments for the animal, such as 
blindness, organ damage, bone and muscle weakness, deformities, and internal bleeding.78 
Chickens were the first animals to become commoditized through practices of the factory 
farm.  Singer writes, “The first animal to be removed from the relatively natural conditions of 
traditional farms and subjected to the full stress of modern intensive farming was the chicken.”79  
The initial step in turning the chicken from animal to commodity was confining the animal 
indoors.  Confinement allows an environment that can be manipulated to encourage faster 
growth with a minimum of food.80  Manipulation of lighting alters the chicken's natural 
disposition.  Through different stages of the chicken’s life, adjustment of the lights favor certain 
behaviors or preferable biological responses.  When crowding becomes a problem, the lights are 
constantly dim.  According to Singer, “The point of this dim lighting is to reduce the effects of 
crowding.  Toward the end of the eight or nine week life of the chicken, there may be as little as 
half a square foot of space per chicken.”81  In such circumstances of overcrowding, without dim 
lighting, stress will often lead chickens to fight, kill, and eat one another.82  Another common 
practice employed by factory farms is de-beaking.  The practice essentially is the removal of a 
portion of the chicken’s beak by cutting it off with a blade.  This process is intended to remedy 
cannibalism and for the most part is successful, leaving chickens completely defenseless.83  
While many farmers contend that de-beaking is not painful for the chicken, Singer refutes this 
contention, notably due to the exceptionally sensitive nerves in the beak.84    
77Mason and Singer, 29. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Singer, Animal Liberation, 98. 
80 Ibid., 99. 
81 Singer, Animal Liberation, 99. 
82 Ibid., 100. 
83 Ibid., 101. 
84 Ibid. 
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Within the factory farm, pigs endure constant and extremely close confinement.  
According to Singer, “Common to all [animals] is a need for physical comfort.  We have seen 
that this elementary requirement is denied to hens; and, as we shall see, it is denied to pigs as 
well.”85  Both male and female pigs endure the practices of factory farming, a sow’s life is 
especially harsh.  After the sow is inseminated, she is locked in a narrow gestational crate, often 
no greater than 18 to 24 inches in width, for nearly the entirety of her four-month pregnancy.86  
Her movement is so restricted that she is unable to turn around or walk.  According to the 
Humane Farming Association (HFA), “A common response shown by animals in highly-
stressful situations where they have little control over their environment is to perform repetitive 
movements, called stereotypies.”87 The repetitive movements of a sow confined include rubbing 
their snout against the crate creating bloody and painful abscesses.88  The sow is moved days 
before she gives birth from the gestational crate to the farrowing crate.  According to the HFA,  
Against all her natural instincts, she must give birth to piglets, nurse them, eat, sleep, 
defecate, drink, stand, and lie in the same cramped space.  The nursing period is cut 
drastically short by the premature separation of the piglets from their mother. The sow is 
immediately re-impregnated – and sent back to an even bleaker existence in the gestation 
crate. This vicious cycle is repeated over and over again until the sow’s “productivity” 
wanes, and she is sent to slaughter.89 
 
If an American dog was subjected to the same lifestyle of a pig in the factory farming industry, 
her owner could be charged with the criminal offense of animal abuse.  Such factory farming 
techniques however, is a common practice. 
85 Ibid., 119-120. 
86 The Humane Farming Association (HFA), “Inside the Pork Industry,” accessed February 24, 2014. 
http://www.hfa.org/porkIndustry.html  
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 The Humane Farming Association (HFA), “Inside the Pork Industry.” 
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Of all intensive livestock farming practices, the methods of raising baby calves for their 
flesh stands as a sobering reminder of the cruelty that the human species can inflict on nonhuman 
animals.  The determining factor for the quality of calf flesh is their diet, physique, and age 
resulting in flesh that is exceptionally tender and much lighter in color than other beef.  Calf 
flesh originated through the slaughter of very young calves, often those still nursing.90  Modern 
practices of factory farming produce flesh from calves that are older and larger, thus maximizing 
profits.  According to Singer,  
The trick [to getting veal from older and bigger calves] depends on keeping the calf in 
highly unnatural conditions.  If the calf were left to grow up outside, its playful nature 
would lead it to romp around the fields.  Soon it would begin to develop muscles, which 
would make its flesh tough.  At the same time it would eat grass and its flesh would lose 
the pale color that the flesh of newborn calves has.91   
 
The predominant approach of raising calves for the human consumption of their flesh consists of 
stringent confinement and a strict diet.  The calf’s removal from his or her mother occurs shortly 
after birth.   The practice of raising calves for veal prescribes their confinement in a small stall 
where they are chained by the neck, fed a liquid diet, and all of their bedding is removed to 
prevent the malnourished calves from eating it.92  Essentially, veal calves live a short life in 
confinement within a small cramped concrete stall, where the standard veal stall in the U.S. is 
under two feet wide.93  Calves remain in this cramped position for almost four months until they 
are slaughtered.  They have a strong desire to suckle, which cannot be satisfied, and they often 
cry out for their absent mothers.94  To maintain the pale color of the meat, the calves are fed an 
90 Ibid. 
91 Singer, Animal Liberation, 129-130. 
92 Singer, Animal Liberation, 130. 
93 Ibid., 131. 
94 Ibid., 132. 
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anemic diet.  The practice of raising calves for veal is nearly universal, even though color of the 
flesh has little effect on the taste.95   
 The exploitation of nonhuman animals through the intensive agricultural practices of 
factory farming shares an ominous link with the enslavement and forced servitude of persons of 
color.  Likewise, the connection between human and nonhuman animals in the industrialization 
of slaughter also details the consequences of human dominion.  Yet, as a whole, modern society 
accepts the abhorrent treatment of nonhuman animals, all the while demonizing the past actions 
of the Nazis or American slaveholders.  Such an inconsistent perspective can be explained only 
by analyzing the moral status of animals in addressing the question of what it is that separates 
humans from nonhuman animals.
95 Ibid., 133. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS 
 
The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?   
-Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles 
and Morals of Legislation 
 
The question of the moral status of the non-human animal long has haunted western 
philosophy, as similar and reoccurring concepts emerge in exploring this vital question.  As 
philosopher Gary Steiner maintains, two of the critical questions concern the kinship between 
human and nonhuman animals, as well as the capacities of nonhuman animals.  Both of these 
questions hold a prominent role in the establishment of the moral status of animals throughout 
the discourse of Western philosophy.1  This idea of kinship is prominent in the reflections of 
Pythagoras on the animal other in the sixth century BCE.  As Steiner contends, “Pythagoras 
espoused an ethic of kinship with animals based on the doctrine of metempsychosis or 
transmigration of souls.”2 The metempsychosis view incorporates two positions: the first is that 
the soul can be transcendent, meaning, according to Steiner, that “the capacity to ascend through 
various embodiments toward ultimate liberation from embodiment.”3  The second position holds 
that the soul can move to and from other embodiments.4  These positions historically have been 
prominent in Western philosophy in considering the moral status of nonhuman animals, namely, 
whether or not the soul can move between human and nonhuman animals.  If the soul is 
transcendental between humans and animals, the moral status of both should also be similar.  
1 Gary Steiner, Anthropocentrism And Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western 
Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 223. 
2 Ibid., 45. 
3 Ibid., 46. 
4 Ibid. 
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The interpretation of Pythagoras’s position on animals, especially his perceived vegetarian 
habits, has been attributed to both metempsychosis positions.  According to Steiner, “Even if 
transmigration involves only human bodies, it is still important to maintain a vegetarian diet and 
to be kind to animals because these activities are conductive to the purification of the soul.”5  
The idea of kinship, however, is reflective of a much higher ethic toward animals.  According to 
Steiner, “If transmigration is considered to involve animal bodies as well as human bodies, then 
the ethical stake on the treatment of animals becomes much higher—one could be eating or 
otherwise mistreating a kindred spirit.”6 Although Pythagoras’s true belief on the animal soul is 
open to interpretation, the idea of kinship is a recurring theme in the history of philosophy and a 
catalyst in deliberations on the moral status of animals. 
 Aristotle understands kinship to rely on the capacities of animals, or how close or distant 
to one another human and nonhuman animals are positioned.7  In regard to capacities, Aristotle’s 
position might seem inherently speciesist.  However, Steiner questions whether this accusation is 
truly warranted: 
In the zoological texts, such as History of Animals and Parts of Animals, Aristotle 
attributes to animals a wide array of capabilities and in many instances appears to 
attribute to them abilities that presumably require belief.  In the psychological, 
metaphysical, and ethical texts, particularly On the Soul and the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle offers his explicit denial that animals are capable of rationality and belief, and 
he attributes to animals what appears to be a much more limited array of capacities.  In 
one of these latter texts Aristotle badly asserts that animals exist entirely for the sake of 
human beings.  This assertion has done much to cement Aristotle’s reputation as a hard-
line speciesist.8  
5 Steiner, 46. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995). 
8 Steiner, 57. 
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Steiner finds the contrasting viewpoints in Aristotle’s position to rest on the focus of each set of 
texts.  In the first, Aristotle takes a naturalist tone wherein he attributes capacities such as 
wisdom and intelligence to animals; in his latter texts, Steiner contends, he “explores the place of 
human beings in the cosmos and thus his focus is on humans and the human condition, in 
particular.”9  Aristotle understands beings within the context of a hierarchy, where the gods 
resided at the top, followed closely by humans, and then animals and plants.  Steiner contends 
that the basis of this order relies on Aristotle’s belief in eudaimonia or happiness.10  Steiner 
writes, “Aristotle is unequivocal in his commitment to the proposition that the end of human 
beings is ‘happiness,’ by which he means not pleasure or material prosperity but rather a 
complex ideal of moral virtue. . . . Happiness in this sense depends crucially on the capacity for 
rational contemplation, which makes human beings most like the gods.”11   
The capacities of an animal are paramount in Aristotle’s position, but the Stoics take the 
distinction by capacities a step further.  Although Aristotle limits the divide between human and 
animal in perceiving humans as a “special kind of animal,” the Stoics stretch this divide by 
restricting the capabilities of the animal and drawing further distinctions between the two.  
Steiner maintains, “They [the Stoics] drastically restrict the scope of animal experience and 
make fundamental distinctions between even the perceptual capacities of rational and nonrational 
beings. . . . In this respect, the Stoics take a decisive step beyond Aristotle, who stops short of 
seeing an overarching teleology in the cosmos as a whole.”12  It is also notable with the later 
Stoics that the position of the early Stoics takes priority as the idea of divine providence becomes 
engrained in Stoic thought.  Steiner contends that the result was that for the first time in the 
9 Steiner, 57-58. 
10 Ibid., 60. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 77. 
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history of Western philosophy, rationality became the signifier for moral superiority of human 
animals over nonhuman animals.13  Although there is no single idea that can be attributed to all 
the Stoic thinkers, the discourse of oikeiosis, or a sense of belonging or community, emerges 
from Stoic thought as a definitive element throughout the course of the movement.14  Steiner 
explains, “The doctrine of oikeiosis is a doctrine of community with an ‘all or nothing’ approach 
to the question of community membership: For a given community, a specific set of capacities is 
necessary and sufficient for community membership, and the nature of those capacities 
determines the purpose or highest form of action for the community.”15  The Stoic ideology of 
community has remained a central theme throughout the history of Western philosophy.  In the 
human community, because the preeminent capacity has become rationality, and thus, nonhuman 
animals have been excluded.  Some humans exclude other humans whom they perceive to lack 
rationality; people of color, indigenous populations, and women among others, often found [and 
find] themselves on the outside of human oikeiosis.   
 Although the Stoics established a perspective of the animal as merely instrumental, 
Plutarch, active toward the end of the Stoic movement, situates the animal in a much different 
context.  His embracing of Platonism led to a vegetarian lifestyle and an original defense of the 
nonhuman animal.  According to Steiner, “For Plutarch, what nature demands of us pertains both 
to our nature and the nature of the animals that many of us are accustomed to eat: our own 
spiritual purification demands that we avoid the savagery of meat eating, and the experiential 
capacities of animals are sufficiently rich that the use of animals for food is a patent injustice 
13 Steiner, 77. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 88. 
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against animals.”16  A defense of animals was a rarity at the time, but when advocated the 
discourse relied on human integrity, not on a heightened status for the animal self.  Plutarch’s 
position assumed concern for animal welfare because of the animal’s capacities and contradicted 
the Stoic conception of the animal.17 Steiner writes, “Implicit in Plutarch’s thinking is a sense of 
‘naturalness,’ according to which animals possess a right to live and prosper.  This sense of 
naturalness confers on human beings the entitlement to use animals and the responsibility to 
respect the intrinsic worth and prerogatives of animals.”18  Plutarch constructs his case for 
animals’ heightened moral status based on their “worth” and “natural dignity.”19  In establishing 
this standpoint, Plutarch points to animal capacities such as intelligence, virtues, and emotions.20 
Even given Plutarch’s intentions, he is still guilty of anthropocentrism because his claims on the 
capacities of animals rely on concepts within the human experience.   
 Some of the early church fathers were influenced by later Stoic philosophers who denied 
moral status to non-human animals.  Saint Augustine, for example, exemplifies early Christian 
doctrine’s absolute denial of the moral status of animals in categorically arguing that humans 
“have no moral obligation whatsoever to animals.”21  Although the Bible offers conflicting views 
regarding the status of animals or human obligation to them, anthropocentric interpretations of 
scripture have been the dominant position, as was the case with Saint Augustine and later Saint 
Thomas Aquinas.  However, the “Christian” position on animals that Aquinas and Augustine 
maintained was not necessarily a reflection of a Hebrew philosophy, but was more influenced by 
16 Steiner, 93. 
17 Ibid., 93-94. 
18 Ibid., 97. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 114. 
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Aristotle and the Stoics.22  As Steiner notes, Jewish philosophers such as Maimonides rejected 
the idea that animals existed only for human benefit, a discourse later abandoned by the early 
church fathers.23  As Steiner claims, “Writing in the fourth century, Augustine articulates a 
Christian dualism according to which spiritual beings are fundamentally superior to physical 
ones.24  Augustine contends, “Among living things, the sentient are placed above those which do 
not have sensation: animals above trees, for instance.  And, among the sentient, the intelligent 
are placed above those which do not have intelligence; men for example, are above cattle.  And 
among the intelligent, the immortal, such as the angels, are placed above the mortal, such as 
men.”25  Augustine’s hierarchy shares an almost exact similarity to what Aristotle proposed, with 
the exception that the immortals at the top are named something different.  In his position, Saint 
Thomas Aquinas shares similarities with Aristotle, the Stoics, and Augustine holding a similar 
viewpoint that animals have been placed here for human use.  Of Aquinas’s position, Steiner 
writes, “The ‘less noble’ creatures exist ‘for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than 
man exist for the sake of man.’ Beings that are ‘more noble’ stand in closer proximity to God, in 
virtue of their rational capacity for self-determination.”26 In both the philosophies of Augustine 
and Aquinas, similar to that of Aristotle, capacities separate humans and animals and constitute 
animals as less.  Most often this lacking capacity is rationality.   
 Immanuel Kant, too, carries on the philosophical tradition of anthropocentrism through 
his ethical theory of deontology. Kant contends that for one to constitute a moral obligation or be 
22Steiner, 113. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 116. 
25 Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, ed. and trans. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 471. 
26 Steiner, 127. 
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a recipient of it, they must qualify as a person.27  On Kant’s perspective, Steiner contends, “A 
person is a being ‘whose existence has in itself an absolute worth, something which as an end in 
itself could be a ground of determinate laws.  To be a ground of determinate laws is to be capable 
of adducing and contemplating the moral law for oneself; it is to be capable of legislating the law 
of respect and following the law that one has legislated.”28 Because the nonhuman animal lack 
the capabilities to adduce and contemplate moral law, Kant deems them a “thing,” that therefore 
can be used as a means to human desire.29  Kant’s perspective essentially objectified the animal 
self and confirmed a belief system that appropriated the nonhuman animal as object and the 
human animal as subject.  Although Kant distances himself from a theological discourse, he uses 
capacities to distinguish and divide humans from animals.   
Perhaps no other belief system contributed more to the nonhuman animal’s lowered 
status than the pre-Enlightenment ideology of Cartesian dualism.30  Dualism holds that the 
separation between mind and body differentiate humans and animals.  Dualism has also been 
crucial in justifying dominion for some groups of people and excusing the oppression of the 
other. Cartesian dualism or Descartes’ substance dualism is a modern version of the ancient 
philosophical conceptions of dualism.31  Substance dualism holds that there are two kinds of 
substance: physical matter and mind.  Howard Robinson explains,  
Descartes believed that there were two kinds of substance: matter, of which the essential 
property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it 
thinks. . . . Descartes was not an atomist, he was, like the others, a mechanist about the 
27 Steiner, 167. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Howard Robinson, “Dualism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2012) 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/dualism/ (accessed June 15, 2014) 
30 Although debate exists among scholars regarding Descartes’ placement in the Enlightenment, his rationalist 
system of philosophy was foundational to Enlightenment thinking and contributed immensely to the advancement 
of knowledge in the period. See (William Bristow, "Enlightenment,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/enlightenment/. 
31 Robinson, “Dualism.” 
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properties of matter. Bodies are machines that work according to their own laws. Except 
where there are minds interfering with it, matter proceeds deterministically, in its own 
right. Where there are minds requiring to influence bodies, they must work by ‘pulling 
levers' in a piece of machinery that already has its own laws of operation.32    
 
Using the idea of substance dualism, Descartes concluded that while humans possessed both 
types of matter, the mechanical body as well as the mind to control it, the mind was absent in the 
nonhuman animal.  The perceived absence of the mind in the animal led him to the conclusion 
that animals were mere matter, only mechanical bodies. 
Strachan Donnelley’s article on organic existence provides an explanation of human 
knowledge that essentially led to the factory farm and the overall depreciation of nature due to 
Cartesian dualism.  Donnelley contends that Cartesian assumptions have little viability in 
differentiating the animal and human. According to Donnelley, “Research centered on organic 
existence and individuality employs a methodology that merges science and philosophy, 
pertinent in differentiating animals and human beings, or substantiating whether or not animals 
should be ethically considered.  Almost every ethical perspective is built on the foundation of the 
individual or self.”33   
Every ethical theory, Donnelley contends, is contingent on individual action and the 
perspectives that govern those actions. If human obligation to animals is indeed warranted, 
several aspects of the human and animal need to be understood.  The first is that human animals, 
in common with non-human animals, are individual organisms.34  According to Donnelley, “To 
bring together and to elucidate our ethical responsibilities to humans, animals, and animate 
nature, we need a common philosophic understanding of ‘organic individuality:’ its nature and 
32 Robinson, “Dualism.” 
33 Strachan Donnelley, “Bioethical Troubles: Animal Individuals and Human Organisms,” The Hastings Center Report 
25, no. 7 (1995): 21. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3528005 (accessed March 25, 2013).   
34 Ibid., 21. 
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ethical significance.”35 Cartesian dualism provides an interpretation of organic individuality in 
relation to metaphysics.  Descartes’ division of mind and body stood as two self-regulating 
elements of world reality, thus setting a fixed point that formed a knowledge base contributing to 
philosophical and scientific thinking alike.36  In dualism, reality consists of the mind and the 
body, which is only an extension of the mind.37  Essentially, dualism contends that animals are 
just a body, a shell; the individual then implies mind and thought.38  In this sense, dualism 
deemphasizes nature and with it nonhuman animals, as well as some humans historically labeled 
as unevolved or as a species different from white humans.  According to Donnelley, “Nature was 
rendered a mere dynamic, causal, mechanistic, and material affair, ‘mere matter in motion.”39 
This viewpoint on nature contributed to a major separation of human and animal that created a 
hierarchy of perspectives, and allowed for the continued marginalization of animals through the 
justification of their use to satisfy the desires of humans.  Obviously, such an outlook remains 
prevalent in Western culture with the practices of factory farming and vivisection, relatively 
modern institutions of animal oppression.  
 Countering the philosophy of Cartesian dualism is the idea of organic individualism, 
which points to the presence of a connection between an animal’s body and their ontology of 
existence.40  Donnelley contends that it is the fragility and finiteness of the living organic form 
(the body) that constitutes the existence of self, identity, and individuality.41  This notion is 
contingent on what humans acknowledge as the state of being.42 “Being” would seem to imply 
35 Donnelley, 21. 
36 Ibid., 22. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 23. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Donnelley, 23. 
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action of one who is alive recognizing the life of another, as well as consciousness or self-
awareness from one’s own ontological perspective.43  To clarify this idea, when humans see a 
nonhuman animal, they recognize this state of being within the animal self as a reflection of their 
own “beingness.”  According to Donnelley,  
We know what it means to be self-concerned or "internally related" to ourselves: to have 
our own individual being as an insistent practical issue, which must be decided by our 
own activity in the world (for example, in breathing, eating, seeking shelter, or avoiding 
enemies). These primordial existential and worldly experiences natively equip us with the 
experiential means or epistemic arsenal to judge the quick from the dead, the animate 
from the inanimate.44  
 
Organic existence implies a certain criterion, an active merger between body and mind, where 
self, the organic living, is manifested through the physical body in possession with the inanimate 
mind; only through a conversion of both, is organic existence possible.45  Organic existence 
implies two major ideas that are relevant in an examination of the factory farm.  First, it rejects 
the philosophy of dualism.  Although factory farming is a modern embodiment of dualist thought 
that relegates the animal to status of “thing”, animals are not merely mechanical objects to be 
used as humans wish.  The entire concept of organic individuality elevates the presence of 
animal awareness.  When animals suffers through pain or stress, an awareness exists of their 
circumstances within their self.  Organic individuality posits a connection between human and 
nonhuman animals in both the recognition of the animate in each other and in the shared 
recognition of finiteness.  To understand the extent of suffering initiated by the practice of 
factory farming and, indeed, to compare it to human suffering aids in better appreciating the 
suffering of another.  Understanding the practices that cause such suffering as well as an ethical 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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standard in regard to animals is necessary.  Should humans care about animal suffering because 
nonhuman animals, like human animals, should be attributed certain rights, or should concern for 
animal suffering derive simply because animals, too, can suffer? 
Philosophers Peter Singer and Tom Regan differ from one another in establishing the 
moral status of animals.  Singer applies a utilitarian ethical theory in his moral consideration of 
animals, but Tom Regan utilizes rights theory to lessen the moral divide between human and 
nonhuman animals.  In explicating Singer’s position, an explanation of the basic assumptions of 
utilitarian theory is necessary.  Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, was an early 
proponent of animal welfare and accepted a consequentialist ethical perspective to confront the 
moral status of animals.  In An Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham 
discussed his theory of utilitarianism, promoting it as one that valued both humans and animals.  
His belief that humans have an obligation to consider animal welfare is evidenced in the 
following passage.  According to Bentham, 
Other animals, which, on account of their interests having been neglected by the 
insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of thing. . . . The day has 
been, I grieve it to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the 
species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated. . . .upon the same footing 
as. . . .animals are still.  It may one day come to be recognised that the number of the 
legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally 
insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should 
trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? 
But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more 
conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose 
the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor, 
Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?46   
In the above passage, Bentham makes a significant claim regarding the ethical consideration for 
animals: limited rationality should not exclude animals from ethical consideration.  This notable 
claim relies on the foundation of suffering as the principal criterion for ethical consideration.  
46 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles and Morals of Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 310. 
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Bentham questions the assertion that only beings of reason are entitled to ethical consideration;  
his strongest point, however, is that lack of rationality alone should not exclude a being from 
having moral status, but that, instead, the ability to suffer is of concern.  For the utilitarian, pain 
and pleasure are of equal importance in measuring utility, the foundation of utilitarian 
ethics.  Instances of pleasure are valued positively, contributing to an increase in utility, while 
instances of pain are valued negatively, subtracting from the net value of an action’s 
consequences.  Because nonhuman animals can experience pain and suffering, utilitarianism as 
Bentham envisioned, extends ethical consideration to nonhuman animals.47   
Like Bentham, philosopher John Stuart Mill was a prominent contributor to utilitarian 
theory.  In Utilitarianism, Mill expands on Bentham’s ideas, clarifying utilitarian theory. 
According to Mill, “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals ‘utility’ as the 
‘greatest-happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.  By happiness is intended 
pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.”48  
Utilitarian theory focuses on the consequences of an action, rather than the motivation for it.  
This means utilitarianism focuses on the product of an action (whether an action produces 
pleasure or pain).  The right (moral) action, then, is the one that produces the greatest amount of 
happiness and least amount of suffering for the greatest number.   
The idea of right action brings up a very important question, one that is central to the 
consideration of the treatment of animals.  If right action produces the greatest happiness and 
least suffering for the greatest number, does this apply to nonhuman animals or only to people?  
Although Mill and Bentham differ on several key features of utilitarianism, according to Mark 
47 Mark Timmons, Moral Theory: An Introduction (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 128-130. 
48 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1981), 10-11. 
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Timmons, “Both accepted the following two claims: Welfare is identical with happiness and 
happiness is identical with pleasure and the absence of pain.”49  If a utilitarian were to base 
ethical decision making on choices that maximize utility, he/she would need to be able to 
measure pleasure and the absence of pain.  For this, Bentham developed what he called felicific 
calculus, a system to measure specific instances of pleasure and pain.  The system calculates 
utility by evaluating seven features for which pleasure and pain are measured.50   Bentham’s 
calculus consisted of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent.  Of 
his seven features, Bentham put the greatest emphasis on intensity and duration and thus viewed 
instances of pleasure or pain through the quantity of the intensity and duration of the sensation.51  
Bentham’s felicific calculus could be implemented by using the established quantity-based 
criteria and assigning a numerical value to instances of pleasure and pain, to thus institute a 
uniform value-based measurement system. Theoretically, Bentham’s felicific calculus could 
distinguish actions that promote the highest degree of utility even in situations where an action 
could affect a great number of people differently.52  What makes utilitarianism such a good 
ethical theory in regard to animals and the factory farm is its concept of hedonism, which is the 
foundation of utilitarian theory.  Hedonism prescribes that pleasure, happiness, and welfare are 
all essentially the same and that pain and suffering negatively affect them. Therefore, 
utilitarianism promotes actions that maximize pleasure for the greatest number of those who can 
experience pleasure and minimize pain for those who can experience pain.  Bentham’s emphasis 
on duration and intensity as measurements of pleasure and pain provides strong evidence that 
utilitarianism is an ethical theory that includes any species that can suffer.   
49 Mark Timmons, 128-130. 
50 Ibid., 130-131. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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Expanding on many of the same ideas Bentham developed, Peter Singer provides an even 
more convincing case for the elevated status of nonhuman animals. Singer contends that animals 
are not due only ethical consideration, but also equal consideration in interests.  Singer’s 
Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests, in essence, stands as a modern form of 
consequentialism.  According to Singer, “The essence of the principle . . . is that we give equal 
weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions. This 
means that if only X and Y would be affected by a possible act, and if X stands to lose more than 
Y stands to gain, it is better not to do the act.”53 Singer’s principle gains emphasis when applied 
to the factory farm, animals, and the human beneficiaries of the practice.  Factory farmers raise 
animals for their flesh, to satisfy consumers’ demand for low-cost meat and increased profits for 
the producer.  Animals becomes victims of factory farming’s dependency on space and cost.  
Animals in the factory farm are forced into confinement for most of their lives in dirty and dark 
places and consume unnatural food injected with growth hormones to spur exceedingly fast 
maturation.  Concerning Singer’s principle, the human gain is consistent with the pleasure of 
taste from the meat and the cost effectiveness that allows humans to indulge their tastes.  The 
losses for the animals, however, are consistent with a life of suffering and eventual death.  In 
regard for Singer’s principle, do animals stand to lose more than humans stand to gain through 
the practice of factory farming?  If animals are indeed worth equal consideration, then their 
losses definitively outweigh the trivial human gains.  The assessment of gains and losses from 
factory farming become evident when considering the veal calves who live a short life of 
suffering (losses) in order to satisfy the pleasure of taste (gains) for humans.  Singer’s principle 
weighs the interests of both parties and establishes that the losses in this situation outweigh the 
gains.       
53 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Google Drive e-book, 21.  
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 The validity of Singer’s principle lies in his contention that animal interests warrant equal 
consideration to human interests.  To validate this claim, Singer must show that animals are due 
equal consideration of interests.  According to Singer, “If [sic] humans are to be regarded as 
equal only to one another, we need some sense of ‘equal’ that does not require any actual, 
descriptive equality of capacities, talents or other qualities.”54  Essentially, Singer’s argument is 
this: If all humans and only humans deserve complete and equal moral status, then there has to 
be some attribute that all humans and only humans possess.  Any attribute that only humans 
have, some humans lack, and any attribute that all humans possess, most, and at least some, 
animals possess.  An opponent of equal consideration for humans and animals might argue that 
equal consideration is not warranted because animals cannot reason or possess morals, as do 
humans.  Singer contests this counter claim because some humans cannot reason or some possess 
few morals.  He, like Bentham, points to infants or humans with severe mental defects (e.g., 
humans in a vegetative state, those afflicted by severe mental illness, or mentally handicapped 
humans) as examples.55  In both cases, however, the potential of the human animal remains 
unacknowledged.  What should be said of the potential capacities that the irrational infant will 
have as he/she matures?  In accounting for human potential, Singer highlights the permanently 
mentally handicapped human as someone who has never, and will never, possess these human 
specific attributes.  According to Singer,  
Philosophers who set out to find a characteristic that will distinguish humans from other 
animals rarely take the course of abandoning these groups of humans by lumping them in 
with the other animals.  It is easy to see why they do not.  To take this line without 
rethinking our attitudes to other animals would entail that we have the right to perform 
54 “All Animals are Equal,” in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, ed. Tom Regan and Peter Singer (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1989), Kindle edition, 7.  
55 Ibid., 8. 
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painful experiments on retarded humans for trivial reasons; similarly it would follow that 
we had the right to rear and kill these humans for food.56 
 
What Singer claims is that humans marginalize and use other animals as they see fit, because 
they see them as inferior due to their assumed lack of reason and rationality; however, they do 
not hold this same position in regard to humans who lack these same skills.  Moreover, Singer 
further refutes claims against equal consideration on the basis of the possession of traits such as 
reasoning or moral awareness, because such assertions would allow humans to justify giving 
higher consideration to certain groups of humans, such as those who are highly intelligent in 
preference to those of low intelligence.57   
 Regan, who prefers a rights discourse to utilitarianism in positioning the moral status of 
animals, challenges Singer’s Equal Consideration of Interests Principle on the basis of flaws in 
utilitarian theory.  Regan’s argument against Singer’s principle of equal interests provides a 
sound examination of Singer’s theory and its relationship to factory farming.  His counter 
argument directly attacks the validity of utilitarianism as an ethical theory in considering 
animals.  According to Regan, 
It is unclear how, as a utilitarian, he can argue that we have a moral obligation to stop 
supporting the practice of raising animals intensively (henceforth symbolized as p) 
because of some statement about the purpose of p. The question the utilitarian must 
answer is not, (a) what is the purpose of p [factory farming]?  It is, (b) All things 
considered, what are the consequences of p [factory farming], and how do they compare 
to the value of the consequences that would result if alternatives to p were adopted and 
supported?”58  
 
56 Singer, “All Animals are Equal,” 8. 
57 Ibid., 9. 
58 “Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism and Animal Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 9, no. 4 (Summer 1980): 310. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265001 (accessed March 30, 2013). 
64 
 
                                                          
Regan’s criticism of Singer’s principle contends:  First, utilitarianism does not give animals’ 
intrinsic value in and of themselves.  Instead, as Regan notes, even if alternatives are adopted 
replacing factory farming, animals could still be used for human consumption.  An example of 
this would be “free-range” animals slaughtered for human consumption.  Singer must also 
confront Regan’s assertion that despite the principle’s grounding in utilitarian thought, it does 
not follow the approach of consequentialism.59  As Regan contends, although the purpose (a) of 
factory farming (p) is substantiated, a utilitarian must account for (b) the consideration of all 
entities involved as well as the potential consequences of factory farming (p) and how they 
compare in value to the consequences that would result if alternatives to factory farming (p) were 
adopted and supported.60  Arguing from the perspective of a utilitarian, Regan analyzes the 
consequences that could result if the factory farm was replaced by another practice.  According 
to Regan, “His [Singer’s] characterization also leaves out much which, from a utilitarian point of 
view must be judged to be highly relevant to determining the morality of p.”61  Regan argues, 
essentially, that Singer fails to account for all the consequences and interests involved in factory 
farming.  According to Regan, “There are, first and most obviously, those who actually raise and 
sell the animals; but there are many others…whose lives revolve around the success or failure of 
the animal industry.”62  Regan also acknowledges the family members of workers employed in 
the industry who would be affected if intensive farming practices were abandoned.  Regan 
writes, “Now, the interests which these persons have in ‘business-as-usual,’ in raising animals 
intensively, go well beyond pleasures of taste and are far from trivial.63  Regan is correct in his 
assumption that if Singer’s principle is justified on the grounds of utilitarianism, then all the 
59 Ibid., 310. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 310-311. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Regan, “Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism and Animal Rights,” 310-311. 
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consequences to the action of abandoning factory farming must be considered.  But this is only 
one reason why Regan supports a rights discourse. 
 Regan’s assessment that all consequences must be considered in Singer’s principle of 
equal interests is valid; however, in considering all the consequences, Singer can still maintain 
his original perspective that his principle would deem factory farming as a wrong action.  Regan 
acknowledges that a utilitarian must investigate fully all the consequences and all entities 
affected by an action.64  My response to Regan’s criticism of Singer is that he misses a crucial 
point within Singer’s principle.  If utilitarianism defines right action as the one that produces the 
greatest amount of happiness and least amount of suffering for the greatest number, Singer’s 
principle is still satisfactory as an argument against factory farming.  Regan’s assessment that 
Singer does not consider all the consequences of ending factory farming for all the humans 
involved does not matter.  When examining the figures presented earlier in this chapter, in 2009 
alone, nine billion animals in the United States endured some degree of suffering before being 
slaughtered for human consumption and 98 percent were products of factory farms.65   Based on 
Singer’s principle, even if every single American suffers negative effects by ending factory 
farming, the number would still pale in comparison to the substantial number of animals who 
suffer and are killed every year in the factory farm and slaughterhouse.  Given the emphasis on 
utility as a significant component of utilitarian theory, Singer’s principle works well, both as a 
theory for the ethical consideration of animals and as a valid utilitarian argument. 
In regard to factory farming and other instances of episodic animal oppression, there are 
many more animals who stand to lose than humans stand to gain, even with every American 
human being considered.  But what if one applies Singer’s principle of equal consideration of 
64 Ibid., 311. 
65 U.S. Department of Agriculture, 3, 12.  
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interests outside of factory farming to, for example, vivisection, that is, medical experimentation 
on animals?  Vivisection is still an oppressive practice, yet in considering future generations of 
humans who might benefit from a medical breakthrough, based, at least in part, on animal 
experimentation and suffering, under Singer’s principle vivisection could be morally justified.  It 
is for circumstances such as this that Regan prefers a rights discourse regarding the treatment of 
animals.  Although Singer maintains a direct duty view, a position that asserts humans have at 
least some direct duties to animals, it falls short of giving them rights.66   
 In The Case for Animal Rights, Regan offers his argument on the superiority of a rights 
discourse over other ethical approaches in elevating the moral status of animals.  Regan’s 
principal claim is that animals as moral agents possess certain basic moral rights.67  According to 
Regan,  
To say that these individuals possess certain rights independently of anyone’s voluntary 
acts, either their own or those of others, and independently of the position they happen to 
occupy in any given institutional arrangement; these rights are universal—that is, they are 
possessed by all relevantly similar individuals. . .all who possess these rights possess 
them equally. . . The principal basic moral right possessed by all moral agents and 
patients is the right to respectful treatment. . . All moral agents and patients must always 
be treated in ways that are consistent with the recognition of their equal possession of 
value of this kind.68 
 
Regan’s position predicates the moral status of animals on a basis similar to that of humans.  
Both possess certain basic rights that protect them against the violation of these rights by others.  
This means that violation of rights cannot be morally justified and is, indeed, a morally wrong 
action.  Regan’s position also establishes that moral agents who possess these basic rights are 
inherently valuable, meaning that moral agents who share this value “must always be treated in 
66 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 202. 
67 Ibid., 327. 
68 Ibid. 
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ways that are consistent with the recognition of their equal possession of value of this kind.”69 
This differs from Singer’s position in that his principle of equal consideration of interests, 
consistent with utilitarian theory, affords animals intrinsic value founded on the pleasure 
principle.  The problem Regan has with this claim is that with their value deriving from the 
pleasure principle, animals have no value in and of themselves.70  This is problematic because 
certain circumstances might negate the utility of pleasure and promote pain and suffering in 
favor of higher order pleasures.71  Some cases of vivisection that benefit human animals could 
morally justify the suffering of nonhuman animals.   
Rights discourse, however, is not without its own contradictions.  The most glaring 
problem the animal rights position must confront is that it is guilty of the problems it attempts to 
remedy.  One such difficulty is that rights discourse is inherently speciesist even though it claims 
not be so.  The reason for this contradiction rests on the extension of rights.  Should rights be 
extended to what is considered lower ordered animals, such as mice? To insects?  To amoebas?  
At some point, a line has to be drawn, favoring some species over others.  There is obviously a 
significant degree of difference between primates and insects, but without differentiating 
between the two, how can rights discourse effectively value one species over the other?  Unlike 
Singer, who uses the existence of pain and suffering as the catalyst to extend his principle of 
equal consideration of interests, Regan and other rights-based philosophers must draw an 
imaginary line within the animal kingdom separating species who are attributed rights and those 
69 Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 327. 
70 Ibid., 328.  
71 For a Utilitarian, such as Mill, higher order pleasures can only be obtained by higher order beings (i.e., human 
animals). 
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who are not.  Is this not the same methodology grounded within anthropocentric ideology, which 
draws an imaginary line dividing the status of humans and other animals?72 
 In his book History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence, Dominick LaCapra 
questions the human—animal divide and in doing so, the shortcomings of rights discourse.    
In his call for a new paradigm that departs from anthropocentrism, LaCapra points out the 
inadequacies of attributing rights to certain groups, but not to others.  Rights discourse is 
understood as a fundamental claim where sovereignty has no bearing or is indeed outside of 
sovereignty.73  So, if nonhuman animals are attributed certain rights or claims, they are outside 
of human dominion and, therefore, their rights should not be infringed upon.  Yet, as LaCapra 
specifies, rights discourse has its limits.  According to the author,  
Whatever the strategic necessity of an appeal to rights in the current context of law and 
ethical debate, the limitations of ‘rights discourse’ suggest that one rethink the entire 
issue and displace the notion of rights in the direction of competing claims, in good part 
to take distance from predictable, conventional expectations, such as the requirement of a 
mutual implication or even a strict reciprocity of right and duty or obligation that prompts 
the question—often the rhetorical question—of whether a dog or a cat can have 
obligations to counterbalance putative ‘rights’.74  
 
LaCapra details a significant conundrum of rights discourse, that of mutuality.  Rights essentially 
can be honored or reciprocated by some beings who are attributed rights, but others beings, 
including some humans and animals, cannot recognize these rights or cannot share in an 
obligation to respect them.  How can a certain set of rights transcend species, ability, age, and so 
on, yet be applied to each and all mutually if an obligation to maintain these rights does not exist 
72 The flaw of rights discourse is due to the priority it places on the agent of moral consideration, which forces a 
speciesist ideology because there remains no other signifier for ethical consideration.  Singer’s principle of 
interests, however, emphasizes a signifier of moral consideration due to the theory’s grounding in utilitarianism 
and the emphasis utilitarianism places on pleasure and pain.  This signifier is at the core of Bentham’s words: “The 
question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” 
73 (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 152.   
74 Ibid. 
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in all entities?  The lack of mutuality limits rights discourse and makes applying rights, 
especially to those who may not possess obligation, a convoluted, if not impossible, endeavor.  
Such glaring errors in rights discourse confound the problem of the human—animal divide and 
although Singer’s Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests is not without its own problems, 
reliance on a shared vulnerability (that is, suffering) unites human and animal at the core of 
being.
70 
 
CHAPTER 5 
HUMAN SLAVERY, ANIMAL SLAVERY: A NECESSARY COMPARISON  
 
We had very bad eatin'. Bread, meat, water.  And they fed it to us in a trough, jes' like the 
hogs. . . . And the flo' in ouah cabin was dirt, and at night we'd jes' take a blanket and lay 
down on the flo'.  The dog was supe'ior to us; they would take him in the house.  
 
-Richard Toler, American Slave Narratives 
  
More than three decades before Topsy’s arrival in America and prior to her becoming 
property of Adam Forepaugh’s circus, another showman attempting to establish footing in the 
business, purchased his first act, but it was not an elephant or any other non-human animal for 
that matter, but instead a former Kentucky slave woman, too old and feeble to be of benefit to 
her master. Years of hardships had rendered her body useless and broken, but her price was 
affordable.1  Unable to pay the hefty cost and upkeep of an elephant, the nearly penniless 
entrepreneur would have to settle for the old slave woman.  She would come to be known as 
Joice Heth, the fabricated 161-year-old nurse of George Washington.2  The young entrepreneur 
who staged the exhibit and claimed ownership over the woman was P.T. Barnum, one of 
America’s first and most famous showman.  According to Michael Daly, “Barnum began by 
exhibiting her in New York, describing himself as ‘proprietor of the negress’ even though 
slavery had been abolished in that state seven years before.”3  Similar to the circus elephants of 
the day, Heth would not receive any of the profits earned, despite Barnum raking in $1,500 a 
week from the exhibit.4   
1 Daly, Topsy, 34. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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 Attendance would eventually drop as public fascination dwindled.  But Barnum devised a 
scheme to regain the former luster of Heth.  According to Daly,  
Barnum provided an early example of his particular genius when he planted a letter in a 
Boston newspaper signed only “A visitor” stating that the exhibit was “a humbug,” but 
the truth was “vastly more interesting.”  “The fact is, Jocie Heth is not a human being,” 
the letter went on.  “What purports to be remarkably old woman, is simply a curiously 
constructed automaton, made up of whalebone, India-rubber, and numerous springs that 
are ingeniously put together, and made to move at the slightest touch according to the 
will of the operator.”5 
 
Barnum’s ploy was a success as visitors again poured in to witness the spectacle.  When Heth 
finally died, having earned Barnum his original investment back several times over, he again 
sought one last opportunity to squeeze more profit out of her.  Daly writes, “He announced a 
public autopsy and 1,500 people paid fifty cents each to squeeze in the City Saloon in Manhattan 
and watch prominent surgeon Dr. David Rogers dissect her.  Rogers determined that she had not 
been much more than eighty, or half the age advertised.”6  The woman’s true identity would 
never be known.  Did she have a family? Anyone who would have missed her or grieved her 
death?  In the end, she probably lived as she had died, spectacularly obscure, absent of any true 
identity and hidden away in a nation that viewed her and others of her likeness as nothing more 
than property.  She might have been Barnum’s first victim, but she would not be his last.  As the 
show grew and Barnum was able to afford and acquire his own performing animals, assuredly 
many met a fate similar to that of the slave woman: a lifelong inferior status, a destitute 
existence, and an abundance of suffering within the grasp of dominion. 
 American culture, forging an association between black humans and nonhuman animals, 
has been entangled in an epidemic of racism and speciesism throughout its history.  However 
unpopular the comparison, these linkages cannot be undone, as the oppression of each has been 
5 Daly, Topsy, 36. 
6 Ibid. 
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shared through several pivotal features: the constructed belief that distinguishes both black 
persons and non-human animals as marginal, the procedural course oppression follows, and the 
analogous details within episodic oppression that victimizes both the nonhuman and human 
animal alike.  Chapter Two suggested a theory of oppression for the first two aspects of 
comparison in the oppression of animals, persons of color, and women, but this chapter will 
account for the explicit similarities in the oppression of some groups of humans and the 
continued oppression of animals.  With an emphasis on Marjorie Spiegel’s work The Dreaded 
Comparison and David Brion Davis’s book Inhuman Bondage, this chapter traces the similarities 
between human and animal oppression, specifically, the enslavement and oppression of blacks 
by connecting their oppression to that of nonhuman animals. 
Spiegel opens The Dreaded Comparison with a historical explanation for the oppression 
of blacks and establishes that the justifications used today for oppressing nonhuman animals are 
similar to those used to defend the enslavement of blacks for centuries.  Spiegel acknowledges 
that most people today accept that the enslavement of black humans was wrong, but in retrospect 
to animals concludes, “We cannot maintain that oppression is fine for some simply because they 
are not like us.”7  Spiegel transitions from the historical foundations of oppression to the 
parallels between human and animal slavery.   
For this chapter, it is paramount to provide an encompassing definition of slavery and its 
link to New World slavery practices. The concept of slavery, as it is understood today, is 
associated with the bondage or forced servitude of humans.  Scholarship on slavery in North 
America centers on enslavement of black persons (and to some extent, that of Native Americans) 
7 Marjorie Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery (New York: Mirror Books/The Institute for 
the Development of Earth Awareness, 1996), 19. 
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from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, with an emphasis on slavery in the 
American South.  But slavery overall escapes an easy definition, as its meaning has varied across 
societies and time, and the institution historically takes many different meanings.  As Stanley 
Engerman notes in his article, “Slavery at Different Times and Places,” “Slavery has been one of 
the most ubiquitous of human institutions, and has existed in many places. It has been present in 
societies dominated by all major religions and ideologies, and had legally lasted in some places 
into the second half of the twentieth century-if not more informally in places until the present 
day.”8  
 If slavery can be defined, Engerman says three issues must be addressed.  First, as 
already alluded to, slavery is not unique to any one group, place, or time.9  Second, Engerman 
writes, “Slavery, when it existed, should not be examined in isolation from other institutions and 
happenings at that or other times. Thus it is important to trace the various linkages of slavery 
with the nonslave aspects of different societies.”10  And last, it must be acknowledged that the 
lines between slavery and what is thought as legitimate labor and social systems have become 
blurred.11  According to Engerman, “Any specific definition of slavery has legal, cultural, 
political, and economic aspects.”12  Engerman contends slavery is also used as a metaphor, 
which further complicates the definition.  If the meaning of slavery constitutes all episodes of 
oppression, then all instances of non-slavery could be seen as freedom, but this only convolutes 
what it means to be free and neglects all the variable states between slavery and freedom.   
8 The American Historical Review 105, no. 2 (April 2000): 480, accessed March 24, 2014. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1571463  
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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 In grasping the similarities and distinctions of slavery in his book Inhuman Bondage: The 
Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World, David Brion Davis iterates that the modern 
conception of slavery may lie in its premodern foundations.  Davis examines the Tupinamba, an 
aboriginal tribe residing off the coast of Brazil at first European contact.  Davis contends, “We 
find that the Tupinamba, like many primitive slaveholding peoples, had no economic need for 
slave labor.  Food was abundant as a result of the hunting done by males and the gathering as 
well as slash-and-burn planting and harvesting done by women.”13  Yet, the Tupinamba who 
were often at war with neighboring tribes, enslaved their captives for a period of time, before 
murdering and eating them as part of a ritual.14  Davis notes that for hunting-and-gathering 
peoples, taking captives in war was not unusual; however, the male captives were almost always 
immediately killed and the female captives were either killed or assimilated into the tribe.15   
 But the practice of holding slaves for the Tupinamba did serve a purpose.  As Davis 
notes,  
As the foreign slaves lived and worked with their captors, they were constantly required 
to humble themselves and show respect to their conquerors.  Thus the function of slavery, 
as in many societies, was to make the Tupinamba feel honored, superior, or almost 
godlike and they defined themselves as “nonslaves.”  It was only in ancient Greece and 
Rome that “nonslave” began to mean “free” in our individualistic sense. 
 
The Tupinamba, prior to executing and consuming their slaves, first humiliated them, 
condemned their tribes, and entered into a game where they allowed them to escape, only to 
recapture them.16  The entirety of this ritual serves as a profound instance of the past converging 
with the present.  Davis elaborates,  
13 Davis, Inhuman Bondage, 48. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 49.  
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It is crucial to realize that such slaves were being treated essentially as animals, a fact 
symbolized by their ritualistic slaughter and the final cannibal feast.  This behavior 
dramatizes the point that, wholly apart from later economic functions, slaves from the 
very beginning were perceived as dehumanized humans—humans deprived of precisely 
those traits and faculties that are prerequisites for human dignity, respect, and honor.17 
 
 The Tupinamba share fascinating linkages to American slaveholders as they not only 
seem to embrace the idea of dominion, but also recognize it and seek ways to exhibit it.  Davis 
draws further linkages between the practices of the Tupinamba and the American lynching of 
blacks.  According to Davis, “That modern Americans have not been so far removed from the 
Tupinamba in a moral or even ritualistic sense can be seen in the enthusiasm for lynching former 
slaves and their descendants a century ago.”18  The lynch mobs might not have eaten their 
victims as the Tupinamba did, Davis points out, but southern whites gathered body parts from 
the victim as souvenirs.19  One such example occurred in Paris, Texas, in 1893, when ten 
thousand whites gathered to lynch Henry Smith, a former slave accused of raping and murdering 
a young white girl in an act perpetrated, “in the mad wantonness of gorilla ferocity.”20  Davis 
describes the scene,  
High on a platform, so the men, women, and children could see the torture of Smith, the 
father and brother of the dead girl applied white-hot irons to Smith’s bare feet and tongue 
before burning out his eyes.  One observer recalled, “a cry that echoed over the prairie 
like the wail of a wild animal”. . . .After the platform had been soaked with oil and set 
ablaze. . . .people raked the ashes to acquire “nigger” buttons, bones, and teeth as relics.  
As with the Tupinamba, we find ritual sacrifice, consecrated by fire, designed to purge 
society of the ultimate domestic enemy.21   
 
Even though the purification by fire in Tupinamba slavery and in southern lynching practices 
share similarities, another link to these episodes of oppression can be observed in the modern 
17 Davis, 49. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 49-50. 
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slavery of animals in the factory farm, where after dismemberment, animal flesh is burned to 
purify the segmented parts for consumption. 
 The burning and dismemberment as part of lynching practices detailed in newspaper 
articles published as recent as the twentieth century transpired less than four decades after the 
1865 abolition of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  One 
such account recorded in the Chicago Record-Herald on May 23, 1902, details the capture and 
murder of African-American Dudley Morgan in Lansing, Texas, the day prior.  According to the 
report, after being accused of assaulting the wife of a section foreman, a mob of 4,000 seized 
Morgan from police custody and dragged him to the outskirts of town.  Mob members bound 
him with rope, tortured him with burning pine timbers driven into his eyes, and then burned him 
alive.22  The report states, “As the fire died down relic hunters started their search for souvenirs. 
Parts of the skull and body were carried away.  The men who captured Morgan were then held 
above the heads of the mob while their pictures were taken.”23  In another account, a black 
couple from Doddsville, Mississippi, Luther Holbert and his wife, accused of murder, while on 
the run were captured by a mob.  Their capture concluded a four-day chase involving 200 men 
and two packs of bloodhounds.24 According to an eyewitness report in the Vicksburg Evening 
Post on February 8, 1904,  
When the two Negroes were captured, they were tied to trees and while the funeral pyres 
were being prepared, they were forced to hold out their hands while one finger at a time 
was chopped off. The fingers were distributed as souvenirs. The ears of the murderers 
were cut off. Holbert was beaten severely, his skull was fractured and one of his eyes, 
knocked out with a stick, hung by a shred from the socket.  Some of the mob used a large 
corkscrew to bore into the flesh of the man and woman. It was applied to their arms, legs 
22 “Negro Tortured to Death by Mob of 4,000,” Chicago Record-Herald, May 23, 1902. 
23 Ibid. 
24 “Negro and Wife Burned,” New York Press Wire Report, February 8, 1904. 
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and body, then pulled out, the spirals tearing out big pieces of raw quivering flesh every 
time it was withdrawn.25 
 
According to statistics provided by the archives at Tuskegee Institute, from 1882 until 
1964, 3,445 lynchings of blacks took place in the United States.26  In the period from 1891 until 
1901, over 100 blacks were lynched in every year, except for two.27  These numbers reveal an 
alarming number of lynchings taking place during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. 
 Even though these reports provide two examples of a common southern practice of 
lynching blacks even after the abolition of slavery, this savage ritual perhaps shares an indirect 
linkage with the slavery practices of the Tupinamba.  However, the taking of dismembered body 
parts as trophies is also a reoccurring tradition in hunting.  It is a common practice in deer 
hunting to dismember the dead buck so that the head may be taken for mounting. As Spiegel 
notes, “It is not surprising that in the highly stylized hunts of the British upper classes, which 
have remained virtually unchanged for centuries, one finds close parallels to the hunting of 
slaves in the Southern United States.”28  These parallels are evidence of the reinforcement of 
dominion and continue to be recognized in the training and use of dogs to hunt both human and 
animal prey, and the dismemberment of the captured body, and the keeping of segments as 
trophies.29  The slavery practices of the Tupinamba, more than anything else, established not out 
of necessity, but for the expression of their dominance.  The profitability of both human and 
25 “Lynched Negro and Wife Were First Mutilated,” Vicksburg Evening Post, February 8, 1904. 
26 University of Missouri-Kansas City. “Lynchings: By Year and Race,” accessed May 2, 2014. 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingyear.html 
27 Ibid. 
28 Spiegel, 62. 
29 Spiegel notes that up until the mid-nineteenth century, some men actually made a profession of training and 
using “nigger dogs” who were taught to hate Negroes in their pursuit of runaway slaves.  It is also relevant to note 
that bloodhounds were also utilized in tracking the Holberts.  A linkage is also evident between the “hunt” of 
humans and animals in American culture and the release and recapture of slaves in Tupinamba culture. 
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animal slavery in America undoubtedly influenced its establishment in the New World and the 
continuance of the practice, but a desire for power and control cannot be dismissed as factors in 
the presence and persistence of both human and animal slavery. 
 The model for human slavery in New World societies also shares foundational 
associations with the domestication of animals.30  Davis claims, “Slavery may well have been 
modeled on the domestication of animals, especially livestock and beasts of burden (i.e., 
‘chattel,’ from the medieval Latin capitale [and Latin capitalis], which was the root for both 
‘cattle’ and ‘capital’).”31  In solidifying the association between the domestication of animals and 
development of human slavery, Davis acknowledges one definitive element that both share, that 
is, both human slaves and animals are assumed to be property.  Harvard sociologist Orlando 
Patterson dismisses this claim, in defining slavery as, “the permanent, violent domination of 
natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.”32  In his review of Patterson’s book Slavery 
and Social Death, V.P. Franklin writes, Patterson’s “definition is significant both for what it 
includes and does not include as part of the cultural baggage of the enslaved.”33 One such 
exclusion, as Franklin notes, is the reference to slaves as property.  According to Franklin, 
“Patterson. . . .believes that ‘to define slavery only as the treatment of human beings as property 
fails as a definition, since it does not really specify any distinct category of persons.’”34  
Patterson’s exclusion of proprietary claims in defining slavery is reasonable, yet one can also 
object to his definition.  If he is going to limit slavery to only those instances concerning 
“persons,” he must be able to define personhood.  Davis seems to imply in linking human slavery 
30 Davis, 50. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 13.   
33 V.P. Franklin, “A Review of Slavery and Social Death by Orlando Patterson,” The Journal of Negro History 68, no. 
2 (Spring 1983): 212, accessed April 4, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2717724 
34 Ibid.  
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to animal domestication that personhood cannot be used as an identifier of slavery because the 
institution of slavery itself essentially dehumanizes the human.  The credibility of Patterson’s 
definition of slavery, which excludes any mention of a relegated status to property, rests on an 
absent definition of personhood.  Davis constructs a similar objection when he states, “I would 
modify Patterson’s view of slavery in two ways. . . .I would restore the crucial element of chattel 
property. . . .The key to this relationship, as I have suggested, lies in the ‘animalization’ or 
‘bestialization’ of slaves.”35  Although Davis’s claim reiterates the devalued status of animals, 
the linkages between human and animal slavery are undeniable. 
 The relegation of the human slave to the status of animal predominated in America 
before, during, and even after the height of slavery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
As Spiegel notes, “Because society’s opinion of animals was so low, racist authors and anti-
abolitionists propagandized against blacks by comparing them to negative stereotypes of non-
human animals.”36  Spiegel points to several animal names such as monkey, ape, fox, buck, and 
coon that were historically used to demean blacks.37  Frequently-used stereotypes of black 
people within American literature have relied on the stereotypes of animals.  According to 
Spiegel, “Reality was blindly ignored by these authors as they churned out banalities of savage 
apes and lewd, promiscuous beasts. . . .Some authors, such as H.R. Helper in his book Nojuque 
(1867), set up “black” and “beastly” as exact synonyms.38  Criticism of these comparisons, while 
warranted, might have dispelled some of the negative connotations associated with blacks, but 
also reinforced the antagonistic perspectives toward animals.39  Spiegel continues, “So ‘beastly’ 
are animals considered, that to be like one implies the worst, that you are bad.  It would logically 
35 Davis, 51. 
36 Spiegel, 33. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 34.   
39 Spiegel, 37. 
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follow that a person who is unlike an animal must by definition be good.”40  The attribution of 
animal qualities to black persons, however, served a purpose even more than deemphasizing 
their human qualities; it also upheld the idea that black persons, like animals, were uncivilized 
and wild and therefore needed, and perhaps even desired, a master for guidance.  This suggestion 
is at the core of Davis’s contention that New World slavery was molded after the domestication 
of animals in ancient times.   
 Although the first historically-documented existence of slavery comes out of 
Mesopotamia around 2000 B.C.E. in Sumerian society, the domestication of animals coincided 
with an agricultural shift from hunting-and-gathering communities to agricultural societies some 
six thousand years earlier.41  Although dogs had been domesticated for nearly two thousand 
years prior to other animal species, Davis writes,  
It was only with the Neolithic Revolution (some ten thousand years ago) that sheep, 
cattle, pigs, horses, goats, and other social animals were domesticated, consequently 
undergoing an evolutionary process called neoteny, or progressive juvenilization.  In 
other words, the domesticated animals became more submissive than their wild 
counterparts, less fearful of strangers, and less aggressive.  Far from being fortuitous, 
these changes in biology and behavior were closely geared to human needs in farming.  
To control such beasts, humans not only branded them but devised collars, chains, prods, 
and whips and also castrated and subjected certain animals to specific breeding 
patterns.42  
 
The mechanisms for control developed along a similar timeline as animal domestication also 
were implemented later for the control of humans in various forms of slavery systems, including 
New World slavery.  Used against humans and animals both, the whip stood as an object 
commanding compliance and a metaphor separating the superior from the subordinate and the 
oppressor from the oppressed.   
40 Ibid. 
41 Davis, 52-53. 
42 Ibid. 
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 The power of the whip and the violence it perpetrated against slaves are paramount in the 
slave narrative of Mary Reynolds.  Reynolds, a former slave, was over 100 years old at the time 
of her Works Progress Administration (WPA) interview in the 1930s.  She was raised on the 
Kilpatrick plantation in Black River, Louisiana.  In her interview, Reynolds details observing 
frequent whippings and the use of the stocks as punishment for running away or disobeying the 
master or overseer’s orders.  As Reynolds recounts, 
Slavery was the worst days was ever seed in the world. They was things past tellin', but I 
got the scars on my old body to show to this day. I seed worse than what happened to me. 
I seed them put the men and women in the stock with they hands screwed down through 
holes in the board and they feets tied together and they naked behinds to the world. 
Solomon the the [sic] overseer beat them with a big whip and massa look on. The niggers 
better not stop in the fields when they hear them yellin'. They cut the flesh most to the 
bones and some they was when they taken them out of stock and put them on the beds, 
they never got up again.43 
 
The overseer on the plantation and the one who administered the whippings was 
Solomon.  He was feared by the slaves more than the master of the plantation Dr. Kilpatrick.44  
According to Reynolds, “We was scart of Solomon and his whip, though, and he didn't like 
frolickin.”45  She speaks of one memory regarding his cruel nature, saying,  “We'd set on the 
floor and pray with our heads down low and sing low, but if Solomon heared he'd come and beat 
on the wall with the stock of his whip. He'd say, ‘I'll come in there and tear the hide off you 
backs.”46  Speaking later about the despised overseer, Reynolds said, “I know that Solomon is 
burnin' in hell today, and it pleasures me to know it.”47  Throughout her time as a slave, 
Reynolds had a close bond with Sara, the daughter of Dr. Kilpatrick.  The girls were very close 
43 American Slave Narratives: An Online Anthology, “Mary Reynolds,” American Studies Hypertexts at the 
University of Virginia, accessed April 14, 2014. http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/wpa/toler1.html    
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 American Slave Narratives: An Online Anthology, “Mary Reynolds.” 
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in age and following the death of Sara’s mother while Sara was still an infant, she was given to 
Mary’s mother to nurse alongside of her own daughter.  The most traumatic event of Mary’s 
enslavement occurred away from the Kilpatrick plantation, after she and a slave boy named 
Turner were hired out as wage hands to a man she called Kidd.  After Turner ran off, according 
to Mary, “Old man Kidd say I knowed bout it, and he tied my wrists together and stripped me. 
He hanged me by the wrists from a limb on a tree and spraddled my legs around the trunk and 
tied my feet together. Then he beat me. He beat me worser than I ever been beat before and I 
faints dead away.”48  Her injuries from the incident were so severe that when she returned home, 
Dr. Kilpatrick determined that although she would survive, she would never be able to have 
children.49  For Mary and other slaves, the pain and suffering inflicted by the beatings certainly 
were merciless, but the humiliation from the act produced more than just physical pain and scars: 
We prays for the end of Trib'lation and the end of beatin's and for shoes that fit our feet. 
We prayed that us niggers could have all we wanted to eat and special for fresh meat. 
Some the old ones say we have to bear all, cause that all we can do. Some say they was 
glad to the time they's dead, cause they'd rather rot in the ground than have the beatin's. 
What I hated most was when they'd beat me and I didn't know what they beat me for, and 
I hated they strippin' me naked as the day I was born.50 
 
The acts of violence committed by a master or overseer against humans and animals have been a 
consistent feature throughout the institution of slavery.  The depravity of such excessive violence 
exhibits not only a priority for compliance to those with power, but the desire to express one’s 
dominion or power over another, whether the victim be a human or nonhuman animal.  These 
violent acts as expressions of power are not only limited to slavery, but also often commence in 
any relationship between the dominant and the submissive.   
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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 In examining the linkage between the domestication of animals and the enslavement of 
humans, Aristotle’s concept of the “natural slave” displays a perspective engrained in the 
justification of enslaving humans and animals.  In Politics, Aristotle maintains that as with the 
male and female, there are those who cannot exist without each other and such is the case with a 
natural ruler and subject, in order that both may be preserved.  Aristotle writes, “For that which 
can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which 
can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master 
and slave have the same interest.”51  Aristotle contends that nature distinguishes certain men as 
masters and others as slaves and due to this natural order, it is in the best interest and therefore 
just for some human beings to be enslaved by others.   
 Likewise, Aristotle compares the idea of the natural slave to that of the domesticated 
animal.  He writes, “The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a 
better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then 
they are preserved.”52  By “preserved,” he means not only that nonhuman animals and some 
humans are destined for enslavement, but also that it is in their best interest to be enslaved 
because slavery ensures their survival.  He continues,  
Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and 
animals, the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors 
that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, 
another's and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to 
have, such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even 
apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of 
tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of 
life.53 
 
51 Aristotle, Politics, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 1999), I:II.  
52 Ibid., I:V 
53 Aristotle, I:V. 
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Before elaborating on a shared model of domestication and slavery, for the purpose of 
this work it must be acknowledged that Aristotle claims not only that animals and “natural 
slaves” need a master, but also that women do as well.  Aristotle writes, “Again, the male is by 
nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, 
of necessity, extends to all mankind.”54  His most significant claim regarding the inferiority of 
women as natural slaves was that their best interest is served by having a master.  
 Davis pointedly refers to Aristotle’s idea of the “natural slave,” when he claims that 
human slavery, at least to some degree, was modeled after animal domestication.  The best 
evidence for this in New World slave practices is that a sort of neoteny (a genetic change in the 
slave, similar to the genetic change from wild animal to domesticated animal) was the goal for 
many slaveholders.55 Davis finds another linkage between the domestication of animals and 
slavery through the process of domestication; likewise, the human slaves coming to America 
were no longer free and autonomous individuals, but property under the control of another 
person.  Once considered property, both the slave and the animal became an instrument or 
extension of their master.56  Like any other instrument that can be utilized in accordance with its 
owner’s wishes, both human and animal slaves become extensions of their master.  
 No symbol solidifies the linkages between human and animal slavery more than the 
image of the slave ship.  According to Spiegel, “Only about fifteen million of some thirty or 
forty million black Africans survived the ordeal of capture and transport to become slaves in the 
Western Hemisphere.”57  Many lost their lives on a cargo ship on their journey to America in 
what came to be known as the “Middle Passage.” 
54 Ibid. 
55 Davis, 53. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Spiegel, 52. 
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In perhaps the most comprehensive work ever compiled on the Atlantic Slave Trade, 
Hugh Thomas establishes 1440 to 1870 as the time period for the slave trade.58  According to 
Thomas, “The Atlantic Slave Trade was, for much of its long life, a governmental enterprise in 
countries concerned. . . .  The main trading nations also created privileged companies concerned 
to carry slaves from Africa to the New World.”59  The majority of slaves arriving in the New 
World were transported through the “Middle Passage” as part of the triangular trade.  Thomas 
writes,  
The typical slave voyage is assumed to have been triangular.  That geometric figure is 
supposed to have been emblematic of its special character.  But there were many 
exceptions, such as the journeys made directly between Brazil and Angola.  There were 
also numerous direct voyages between the English North American colonies and Africa 
in the late eighteenth century, and similar journeys later still between Cuba and Africa. . . 
. Still, the classic journey, probably responsible for three-quarters of all voyages, was one 
which began in Europe, picked up slaves in Africa in exchange for European 
manufacturers, carried the slaves to the Americas, and then returned to Europe with 
certain tropical American goods which slaves would probably have helped harvest.60  
  
The slave ship epitomized the voyage through the Middle Passage and the extreme 
suffering and death by the captive passengers within its walls position this vessel of oppression 
alongside the slaughterhouse and Nazi gas chamber.  The Reverend Robert Walsh, in an 1829 
account, describes the conditions of a slave ship after its voyage to the Americas.  According to 
his account, the ship had departed from the coast of Africa carrying 336 males and 226 females 
onboard, the trek lasted seventeen days during which time fifty-five had been thrown 
overboard.61  The slaves were positioned beneath the deck, under grated hatchways.  According 
58 Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440 to 1870 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2013), Kindle. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 PBS, “Aboard a Slave Ship: An Account by the Rev. Robert Walsh 1829,” accessed April 2, 2014. http://www-
tc.pbs.org/wnet/historyofus/web05/features/source/docs/C04.pdf 
86 
 
                                                          
to Walsh’s account, “The space was so low that they sat between each other's legs and stowed so 
close together that there was no possibility of their lying down or at all changing their position. . 
. .they were all branded like sheep with the owners’ marks of different forms.”62  On their 
condition upon arrival, Walsh writes, “Some, however, hung down their heads in apparently 
hopeless dejection; some were greatly emaciated, and some, particularly children, seemed 
dying.”63  Walsh writes about the conditions, calling the heat and odor below deck, “so offensive 
that it was quite impossible to enter them, even had there been room.”64  But of all the deplorable 
elements of what Walsh witnessed, he writes, “the circumstance which struck us most forcibly 
was how it was possible for such a number of human beings to exist, packed up and wedged 
together as tight as they could cram.”65  Walsh details that the slaves were separated into two 
compartments: 226 women shared a space of 288 square feet and 336 men fit into a space of 800 
square feet.66  When the grates were opened, Walsh writes, “It is impossible to conceive the 
effect of this eruption—517 fellow creatures of all ages and sexes, some children, some adults, 
some old men and women, all in a state of total nudity, scrambling out together to taste the 
luxury of a little fresh air and water.”67  The degree of suffering Walsh had witnessed was never 
more apparent than when water was finally brought on board for the enslaved passengers.  
According to his account, 
After enjoying for a short time the unusual luxury of air, some water was brought; it was 
then that the extent of their sufferings was exposed in a fearful manner. They all rushed 
like maniacs towards it. No entreaties or threats or blows could restrain them; they 
shrieked and struggled and fought with one another for a drop of this precious liquid, as if 
they grew rabid at the sight of it. . . . I was informed by my friends, who had passed so 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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long a time on the coast of Africa and visited so many ships, that this was one of the best 
they had seen.68 
  
 The images of such tremendous suffering depicted in Walsh’s account might seem 
inconceivable today, but such conditions are still very much a part of present-day American 
society. The difference now is that the victim has changed.  According to Spiegel, “Today it is 
common to call such a ship a ‘cattle boat’, just as Jews and others were transported to 
concentration camps in what have been frequently referred to as ‘cattle cars.”69  The reason for 
this is that within the factory farming industry, animals are enduring very similar conditions, 
including cramped and confined living spaces, unnatural and unsanitary 
environments, transportation in overcrowded vehicles, and travel of sometimes great distances in 
extreme temperatures.  Like the black human slaves in America, whom white society deemed of 
such a lowly status that they could be designated as property, nonhuman animals continue to 
occupy a similar lowly position.  These sentient beings are entrenched in a cruel and unjust 
system of oppression and violence that in its extremity can only be compared in American 
history and culture only to the institution of human slavery.  The comparisons between the two 
are not just relevant, but necessary, as an ominous reminder of the tyrannical realities of human 
dominion.
68 PBS, “Aboard a Slave Ship.” 
69 Spiegel, 55. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT: A FUSED OPPRESSION 
 
Ultimately women, who often find themselves in muted dialogue with the dominant 
culture, become the source for insights in the oppression of animals.  
 
-Carol Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat 
  
During meetings held between abolitionist newspaper editor Horace Greeley and early 
feminists Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone, Amelia Bloomer, and Susan B. Anthony, the 
group toasted “Women’s Rights and vegetarianism.”1  Although early American feminism and 
abolitionism historically were interwoven, scholars often refuse (or fail) to include animals 
rights—or animal welfare—in the discourse of abolitionism and feminism.  In fact, animal rights 
and traditional humanistic social justice are often oppositional, especially in marginal human 
groups attempting to escape the connotations of being non-rational or of occupying a lowly 
status similar to that of animals.  However, as I have contended throughout this work, there are 
profound linkages among the oppression of animals, black humans, and women in Western 
culture. Moreover, the oppression of one group is often contingent on the oppression of the other.   
 In her monumental work The Sexual Politics of Meat, Carol Adams develops a feminist-
vegetarian critical theory that fuses the oppression of women with the oppression of animals by 
focusing on societal mechanisms used to justify and disguise a long history of speciesism and 
sexism within the patriarchal West.  Adams centers the objectification of women and animals in 
a modern context, by exploring the linkages among the marginalization, isolation, and 
exploitation of animals and of women; she notes their linkage within a patriarchal culture that 
1 Steven Wise, Drawing the Line:  Science and the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge: Perseus Publishing, 2002), 
17. 
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promotes the consumption of dead animal flesh.  Two points of significance are Adams’s 
discussion of the absent referent, which is a fixture of oppressive language, and the idea of 
dismemberment, both contributors to the oppressive property of isolation outlined in Chapter 2.   
 The concept of the absent referent recognizes that language can promote the dominant 
culture’s ideology or belief system through making the true meaning of a term absent by 
replacing it with something different altogether.2  According to Adams, “Our concern is with the 
objectification of consumption through language, so that meat’s true meaning is cast out.  Behind 
every meat meal is an absence, the death of the animal whose place the meat takes.  With the 
word ‘meat’ the truth about this death is absent.”3  The absent referent upholds the oppression of 
animals, women, and persons of color.  The linkages among these groups occur because of their 
places outside of the dominant culture Where their subordination (or oppression) becomes 
manifest by the language of the white male patriarchy.  Within a patriarchal society, Adams 
contends, “language is male-centered and human-oriented.”4  According to the author, “When 
we use the adjective ‘male,’. . . we all assume that it is referring solely to human males.  Besides 
the human oriented notions that accompany our use of words such as male and female, we use 
the word ‘animal’ as though it did not refer to human beings, as though we too are not animals.”5   
 Further, patriarchal language elevates the pronoun “he” above “she” and objectifies the 
animal as “it.”  The male pronoun is dominant over the female pronoun in that “he” can be used 
interchangeably and specifically in the place of “she,” but labeling the animal as “it,” lowers 
his/her status to that of an object.6  What this means is that “he” is the major power, “she” is a 
minor power, but “it” is powerless.  And as Adams mentions, “it” refers to the inanimate, or 
2 Carol Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (New York: Continuum, 2010), 92. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 93. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Adams, 93. 
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simply, that which is not alive.7  The status of both female humans and non-human animals falls 
below that of male humans, with animals at the lowest level in a hierarchy of species and gender 
as evidenced by human language.   Adams sees the structure of human language and the 
treatment of animals as interchangeable and consistent in their oppressive tendencies.  According 
to Adams,  
Our culture generally accepts animals’ oppression and finds nothing ethically or 
politically disturbing about the exploitation of animals for the benefit of people.  Hence 
our language is structured to convey this acceptance.  We live in a culture that has 
institutionalized the oppression of animals on at least two levels: in the formal structures 
such as slaughterhouses, meat markets, zoos, laboratories, and circuses, and through our 
language.8   
 
A racial linkage also characterizes the language of oppression.  Many animal caretakers 
refer to themselves as masters or owners of the animals with whom they share a life.  Adams 
acknowledges that engaging in this type of language links to the practice of human slavery.9  
However, in reference to the previous chapter, if human slavery was indeed modeled after animal 
domestication, than the use of the word master, in common with use of the whip or prod, more 
than likely originated first with the animal. 
 In a patriarchal society, language fuses the oppressions of those with lesser statuses 
within the dominant culture.10  This union in turn implicitly links women with animals and each 
to any group outside the dominant culture reflected in the language of oppression.  Although 
language may reflect a fused oppression between women and animals, patriarchal language also 
can be used to refer to anyone outside the dominant culture.  One example of this is the usage of 
the term “bitch,” specifically when referring directly to a female human.  Patriarchal culture has 
7 Ibid., 103. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 95. 
10 Ibid., 102. 
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adopted the term as language used to reflect oppression, but also the bastardization of “bitch” 
reflects poorly on the animal.  “Bitch” always carries with it a very negative connotation, 
regardless of the context in which it is used.  Similarly, the term “beast” or “beastly” often refer 
to indigenous populations and people of color assumed to be less than human, or animalistic.  
Given the history of the word’s usage, referring to humans or animals as “beast” represents 
diminishing of both their statuses.  In both word usages (“bitch” and “beast”), humans presume 
the lesser status of animals, but the oppression of animals, too, can be indicated by their taking 
on the “inferior status” of women.11  Animals take the “inferior status” of women when labeled 
the minor power of “she.”  Adams claims that animals who are being hunted are often referred to 
as she, a minor power and vanquished power, because “she” is about to be killed by the hunter.12  
She expounds on this idea in discussing the work of French linguist André Joly,  
As Joly points out, “sportsmen will often speak of a hare and a fish as she.”  He 
continues: “In fact, she has acquired a very special function in Modern English: it is 
expressly used to refer to an animal regarded as a minor power…Sportsmen, whalers, 
fisherman are in special relation to the animal.  Whatever its size or strength, it is 
regarded as a potential prey, a power that has to be destroyed—for sport or food—hence 
a dominated power.” She represents not only a minor power, but a vanquished power, a 
soon-to-be-killed powerless animal.  Male animals become symbolically female, 
representing the violated victim of male violence.13 
  
A fused oppression emphasizes circumstances where language is reflective of the 
oppression of women by associating them with the inferior status of animals or the oppressed 
status of animals reflects the use of language that associates them with lowly status of women.  
But perhaps the greatest power implemented through humans’ use of oppressive language and 
the absent referent is the ability of words to mask the truth.  In reiterating Adams’s discussion of 
11 Adams, 102. 
12 Ibid., 102-103. 
13 Ibid. 
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the term “meat,” what is true is being masked, hidden by language.  The power of masking the 
truth through language stands as a tool to isolate the marginal and keep them in a position of 
submissiveness.  Language has the power to oppress, control, and mask the truth, but it also has 
the ability to liberate.  As Adams discusses, language also bestows the power to name.   
According to the author, “Vegetarians reform inadequate language by coining new words.  
Through new naming, vegetarians apply principles that demand that the existing relationship 
between human beings and the other animals be changed.”14  The naming of vegetarian signaled 
a monumental moment in a historical fight against the killing of animals.15  What naming can 
really provide is the correction of language by unmasking the truth, in relinquishing the absent 
referent. 
 Although utilizing language to obscure the consumption of dead animal flesh, 
dismemberment of the animal body also helps hide the truth of what humans consume.  The 
dismemberment of the animal body reinforces, or rather encourages, the use of an absent 
referent.  According to Adams,  
After being butchered, fragmented body parts are often renamed to obscure the fact that 
these were once animals.  After death, cows become roast beef, steak, hamburger; pigs 
become pork, bacon, sausage.  Since objects are possessions they cannot have 
possessions; thus, we say “leg of lamb” not a “lamb’s leg,” “chicken wings” not a 
“chicken’s wings.16 
 
Adams alludes to an interesting idea, especially in connecting the shared oppression between 
women and animals.  The most notable aspect of dismemberment or fragmentation is that the 
process further objectifies animals and allows language to mask the dismembered parts by 
further removing the identity of the animal, but dismemberment like language, also exemplifies a 
14 Adams, 110.   
15 Ibid., 110. 
16 Ibid., 74. 
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fused oppression with women.  How is it, then, that women share in this fused oppression?  In 
the literal sense, violence against women fuses this connection.  As Adams discusses, women 
who are raped often express feeling like a piece of meat during the encounter.17  Dismembered 
animals become objectified to meet the desires of humans through consumption, thus reinforcing 
human dominion over the nonhuman animal.  Moreover, rape deems woman a sexual object, 
which, in turn, reinforces the domination of man.  Dismemberment changes the animal from that 
which is living and breathing to segmented objects (e.g., loin, rib, chuck, round).  Women, too, 
are fragmented through a metaphorical sexual dismembering (the epitome of male domination) 
with an objectified fragmentation of their bodies.18  As the cleaver is to the dismemberment of an 
animal, the camera is to the dismembering of the female body.  This is true in regard to 
pornography where the camera, like the cleaver, fragments the body and replaces the status of a 
living human with a sexual object, with the camera metaphorically dismembering the woman 
into body parts of sexual desire.19   
If dismemberment can be understood as a tool of oppression by isolating marginalized 
humans and animals, then a similar linkage can be found in the dismemberment of the African 
slave family unit.  At slave auctions, mothers and fathers were separated from their children, 
husbands from their wives, and siblings from each other.  In his autobiography Twelve Years a 
Slave, Solomon Northup recounts the ordeal of one mother, Eliza, being separated from her 
children after mother and children were all sold to different masters.  The first of her children 
sold was her young son Randall.  Northup writes, “All the time the trade was going on, Eliza was 
crying aloud, and wringing her hands. She besought the man not to buy him, unless he also 
bought herself and Emily. She promised, in that case, to be the most faithful slave that ever 
17 Adams, 74. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 87. 
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lived.”20  Her pleas would be of no avail as her son was sold.  When the exchange was finalized, 
“Eliza ran to him; embraced him passionately; kissed him again and again; told him to remember 
her— all the while her tears falling in the boy's face like rain.”21  After a few days had passed, 
Eliza and her young daughter Emily were separated next.  Northup recounts the tragic event, 
writing,  
It would be a relief if I could consistently pass over in silence the scene that now ensued. 
It recalls memories more mournful and affecting than any language can portray. I have 
seen mothers kissing for the last time the faces of their dead offspring; I have seen them 
looking down into the grave, as the earth fell with a dull sound upon their coffins, hiding 
them from their eyes forever; but never have I seen such an exhibition of intense, 
unmeasured, and unbounded grief, as when Eliza was parted from her child. She broke 
from her place in the line of women, and rushing down where Emily was standing, 
caught her in her arms. The child, sensible of some impending danger, instinctively 
fastened her hands around her mother's neck, and nestled her little head upon her bosom. 
Freeman sternly ordered her to be quiet, but she did not heed him. He caught her by the 
arm and pulled her rudely, but she only clung the closer to the child. Then, with a volley 
of great oaths, he struck her such a heartless blow, that she staggered backward, and was 
like to fall. . . .”Mercy, mercy, master!” she cried, falling on her knees. “Please, master, 
buy Emily. I can never work any if she is taken from me: I will die.”  When Eliza heard 
Freeman's determination not to part with Emily, she became absolutely frantic. . . .“I will 
not go without her. They shall not take her from me,” she fairly shrieked, her shrieks 
commingling with the loud and angry voice of Freeman, commanding her to be silent. . . 
.finally, Freeman, out of patience, tore Emily from her mother by main force, the two 
clinging to each other with all their might. . . .“Don't leave me, mama—don't leave me,” 
screamed the child, as its mother was pushed harshly forward; “Don't leave me—come 
back, mama,” she still cried, stretching forth her little arms imploringly. But she cried in 
vain. Out of the door and into the street we were quickly hurried. Still we could hear her 
calling to her mother, “Come back—don't leave me—come back, mama,” until her infant 
voice grew faint and still more faint, and gradually died away as distance intervened, and 
finally was wholly lost.22 
  
20 Solomon Northup, Twelve Years A Slave, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1997), 81. 
21 Ibid., 81-82 
22Solomon Northup, 85-88. 
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Although the family unit for slaves empowered them through providing a sense of solidarity, 
love, and kinship, the fracture of the slave family was a form of dismemberment.  By severing 
the familial bonds of slaves, masters kept them in a marginal, powerless, and inferior position.  
The dismemberment of the slave family also holds emphasis for slave women, in that as mothers, 
little else could reduce them to a state of such incredible powerlessness as separating them from 
their children, and thus dismembering them from their roles as mothers.   
Adams’s discussion of the “texts of meat” provides another linkage between the 
oppression of women and animals.  The texts of meat stand as a cultural text that members of 
society adhere to due to the recognizable message “meat” conveys in a patriarchal society.23  
According to Adams, “The texts of meat which we assimilate into our lives include the 
expectation that people should eat animals and that meat is good for you.”24  The endurance of 
the texts of meat is reflective in society’s attitudes, propagated through imagery and conditioned 
through what is accepted as normal, whether this be the enslavement of blacks, the oppression of 
women, or the eating of animal flesh.  The cultural text of meat is also gendered, perceived in the 
relationship between meat and virility.25  This relationship has been so engrained in the West that 
it has become a part of the American cultural DNA.  Members of society are indoctrinated in the 
texts of meat from birth and the vast majority sees meat as a part of the American identity and a 
prominent aspect of their way of life.  For most western humans, this explains their reluctance to 
give up flesh eating or to form an oppositional opinion regarding the status of animals.  For 
women residing in a patriarchal society, opposition to the texts of meat is not only an opposition 
to meat eating, but also opposition to the dominant culture.  It could be the case that the 
vegetarianism of writers represents opposition to the dominant culture and thus literary critics are 
23 Adams, 26. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 48-49.  
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prone to ignore such opposition According to Adams, “Why is the vegetarian aspect to a writer 
or her work often ignored by literary critics? I struck upon the idea of the texts of meat to answer 
these questions. By speaking of the texts of meat we situate the production of meat’s meaning 
within a political-cultural context. None of us chooses the meanings that constitute the texts of 
meat, we adhere to them.”26   
 Although Adams contends that flesh eating fuses the oppression of women and animals, 
men, and even many women, remain enmeshed in the texts of meat.  As proponents of equal 
status of all humans, feminists, by all accounts, should be opposed to flesh eating and the texts of 
meat, yet most are not.  If women are to rise to the status of men, perhaps they see similar eating 
habits as an elevation within the patriarchal hierarchy.  Yet, as Adams offers in her feminist-
vegetarian critical theory, feminism and vegetarianism/veganism go hand in hand as a 
consequence of the fused oppressions of animals and women in patriarchal societies. 
 To explicate the fused oppression of women, blacks, and animals in American culture, 
the parallels drawn in instances of violence against women and, consequently, in man’s desire to 
dominate nature, should be highlighted as significant features in a non-discriminatory culture of 
oppression.  According to Carolyn Merchant in her work Earthcare: Women and the 
Environment, “We must reexamine the formation of a world view and a science that, by 
reconceptualizing reality as a machine rather than a living organism, sanctioned the domination 
of both nature and women.”27  Merchant contends that nature was fashioned by Western scholars 
as female through two historical perspectives.  In the first perspective, nature appears as mother, 
relating to “a kindly beneficent female who provided for the needs of mankind in an ordered, 
26 Adams, 26. 
27 Carolyn Merchant, Earthcare: Women and the Environment (New York: Routledge, 1996), 76. 
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planned universe.”28  This interpretation conveys the familiar usage of “Mother Nature.”  The 
second idea constitutes an opposing perspective, in that nature is wild, chaotic, violent, and 
uncontrollable.29  Both perspectives of nature, however, are associated as female.  The metaphor 
of nature as a kind and nurturing mother, according to Merchant, “gradually vanished as a 
dominant image as the Scientific Revolution proceeded to mechanize and to rationalize the world 
view.”30  The perception of nature as wild and uncontrollable rationalized white men’s 
domination of nature, and with it, women, blacks, indigenous peoples, animals, all assumed to be 
wild and needing someone to control them.31   
 The association between women and nature ultimately link to the powerlessness of 
women and animals within the dominant white, patriarchal culture.  As Josephine Donovan 
contends “The anomalous and the powerless include women and animals, both of whose 
subjectivities and realities are erased or converted into manipulable objects—‘the material of 
subjugation’—at the mercy of the rationalist manipulator, whose self-worth is established by the 
fact that he thus subdues his environment.”32  As “the material of subjugation” within capitalist 
societies, women’s production is devalued.  Donovan explains, “Their labor has prepared 
material for immediate use by the household rather than for use as a commodity for exchange or 
for monetary payment.”33  Capitalism has essentially objectified women, as it has black humans 
and animals.  As with nonhuman animals and slaves, such objectification has led to women’s 
susceptibility to violence, their historical domesticity (being confined to the home to keep house 
and raise children), and their place outside of the dominant group.  The early American feminists 
28 Ibid., 77 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Josephine Donovan, “Animal Rights and Feminist Theory,” Signs 15, no. 2 (Winter 1990): 362, accessed March 
12, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3174490  
33 Donovan, 362. 
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had it right in toasting women’s rights and vegetarianism, wherein they recognized a connection 
between the two that has remained for well over a century.  Because women share their 
oppression in many regards with that of animals, as was the case in the push for abolition, it 
seems women will once again carry the torch towards animal liberation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: HUMANS, ANIMALS, AND SHARING THE SHADOW 
 
We require now to extend the great principles of liberty, equality and fraternity over the lives of 
animals.  Let animal slavery join human slavery in the graveyard of the past. 
 
-Norm Phelps, Changing the Game: Why the Battle 
for Animal Liberation Is So Hard and How We Can 
Win It 
  
In 1990, Smithfield Foods began construction on a 973,000 square-foot slaughterhouse in 
Bladen County, North Carolina, in a small town known as Tar Heel.  Ten years later the site 
stands as the final stop for 38,000 pigs every day and nine million each year.  In his book An 
American Trilogy, Steven Wise traces the history of oppression at a small site that originally was 
the home of Native Americans until they were driven off by white settlers.  Later, the site was 
occupied by a large slave plantation.  Today, the location is home to a large Smithfield 
slaughterhouse and factory pig farm. 1  Wise writes, “Today we acknowledge that our genocide 
of Native Americans was wrong. . . .we agree that we were wrong to enslave millions of blacks 
and to mistreat them after they became free.  Today global climate change and other catastrophes 
we continue to cause are leading us to a new understanding of how to act toward all of God’s 
creation—including the pigs of Bladen County.”2  If the history of a little town in North Carolina 
can teach us anything, it is that within the shadows of dominion have resided human and 
nonhuman animals alike.   
1 Steven Wise, An American Trilogy: Death, Slavery, and Dominion on the Banks of the Cape Fear River (Cambridge: 
Da Capo Press, 2009), 1. 
2 Ibid., 9. 
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 A central focus of this work has been on examining the human—animal divide and the 
ideologies that have contributed to anthropocentric beliefs and attitudes.  Anthropocentrism has 
been engrained in the history of Western philosophy, effectively relegating nonhuman animals to 
a footnote in the discourse of the human experience and upholding the divide between that which 
is called human and that which is called animal.  The anthropocentric quality of Western thought 
has been interwoven in the fabric of Western society and remains a prominent component in 
justifying the exploitation, oppression, and enslavement of animals through societal customs and 
institutions such as the factory farm, hunting, and vivisection. 
The ideas about community (kinship) and capacities encourage anthropocentrism, but 
they are also vital in establishing an ethic for treatment of animals.  Because humans analyze the 
moral status of animals based on their own conception of the human self, anthropocentrism 
seems inherent to the animal rights/welfare discourse.  Postmodern conceptions of the animal 
have confronted anthropocentrism but postmodernists continue to be guilty of a similar 
anthropocentric habit.  In Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents, Steiner writes,  
The confrontation between the liberal humanist and Romantic conceptions of animals 
 poses a central problem for contemporary environmental ethics: The tension between 
 human self-assertion and the sense that we are part of a larger cosmic whole seems 
 irreducible; and yet as long as this tension remains unresolved, the moral status of 
 animals will remain critically problematic. . . . The confrontation between the liberal and 
 Romantic conceptions reflects a profound ambivalence between two seemingly 
 incommensurable ways of conceiving of value: one that makes human valuations the 
 source of all value, and another according to which value has a cosmic source that 
 transcends human experience.3  
 
The conflict between human morality and the conception of the nonhuman animal forces 
anthropocentrism, even if moral theory focuses on inclusion, rather than exclusion, of the 
nonhuman animal.  It seems that the anthropocentric tendencies of moral theory are a limit of 
3 Steiner, Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents, 202. 
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Western philosophy that cannot be remedied.  Although postmodern thinkers such as Derrida 
attempted to establish a kinship between human and nonhuman animals on the basis of a shared 
environment, all animals interpret their environment differently.4   Heidegger contends that 
nonhuman animals are limited in what they can do within their environment or at least limited in 
comparison to humans.  He writes, “They are limited by language and limited by their lack of 
richness in comparison to humans in how they can perceive their environment.”5  But how can 
humans know that animals cannot perceive their environment as do humans?  Assuming that 
humans could know, it is an anthropocentric assumption supposing to know what life is like for 
nonhuman animals.  According to Steiner, “Beyond acknowledging that animals possess their 
own kind of subjectivity, we may ultimately never be in a position to answer Thomas Nagel’s 
question ‘What is it like to be a bat?’  One might even say that ‘we cannot really image [sic] 
what [the animal’s] world looks like without reverting to anthropocentrism,’ and that ‘this is our 
poverty.”6  
Posthumanism stands as a discourse that moves beyond humanism and thus minimizes 
the divide between human and nonhuman animals.  Posthumanism essentially decenters 
the human animal.7  In What is Posthumanism? Cary Wolfe defines its meaning by linking it 
with postmodernism.  As Wolfe states,  
My sense of posthumanism is thus analogous to Jean-Francois Lyotard’s paradoxical 
rendering of the postmodern: it comes both before and after humanism: before in the 
sense that it names the embodiment and embeddedness of the human being in not just its 
biological but also its technological world, the prosthetic coevolution of the human 
animal with the technicity of tools and external archival mechanisms (such as language 
4 Steiner, 209. 
5 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 
1962), 288-289. 
6 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It like to Be a Bat?” Mortal Questions, 165-180 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1979), 
quoted in Steiner, Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents, 213. 
7 Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xv. 
102 
 
                                                          
and culture). . . . But it comes after in the sense that posthumanism names a historical 
moment in which the decentering of the human by its imbrication in technical, medical, 
informatic, and economic networks is increasingly impossible to ignore, a historical 
development that points toward the necessity of new theoretical paradigms, a new model 
of thought that comes after the cultural repressions and fantasies, the philosophical 
protocols and evasions, of humanism as a historically specific phenomenon.8 
 
If a humanist discourse contributed to anthropocentric, sexist, and racist ideologies, 
posthumanism transcends the distinctions that allowed the formation of these ideologies.  For the 
nonhuman animal, posthumanism develops a starting point that should drive humans’ ethical 
response to animals, mainly, the shared presence of being, mortality, and finitude.9   
In developing a posthumanist response to the question of the animal, Derrida’s The 
Animal That Therefore I Am reflects on the question of the animal in several contexts, notably, 
the animal in philosophy, in history, and most prominently, within the human or the human 
within the animal.  The title The Animal That Therefore I Am reflects not only Derrida’s belief 
about the animal—human divide, but also his belief about the absurdity of separating humans 
and animals while categorizing all nonhuman animal species as the same.  The title reflects the 
ambiguity within the word “animal.”  According to Derrida, “Back to the question of what I do 
when ‘I am’ or ‘I follow’. . . if I am following this suite then, I move from ‘the ends of man,’ that 
is the confines of man, to ‘the crossing of borders’ between man and animal.”10  In his title, 
Derrida acknowledges the linkage of the human animal to the nonhuman animal and expounds 
on it in discussing an encounter with his cat.  Derrida wrote, “I often ask myself. . .who I am—
and who I am (following) at the moment when, caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of an 
8 Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?  xv-xvi. 
9 Cary Wolfe, “Flesh and Finitude: Thinking Animals in (Post) Humanist Philosophy.” SubStance 37, no. 3 (2008): 8,  
accessed May 1, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25195184 
10 The Animal That Therefore I Am, edited by Marie-Louise Mallet and translated by David Wills (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008), accessed April 20, 2014.  Google Play E-book, 16-17. 
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animal, for example, the eyes of a cat, I have trouble . . . overcoming my embarrassment.”11  
This encounter led him to question the subjects of his shame, the humanity and animality within 
himself, and the animal that lies behind the gaze.  He asks, “Ashamed of what and naked before 
whom?”12  Through this discussion Derrida sets in motion the overall focus of his work, how the 
animal—human distinction is drawn. 
 Throughout his work, Derrida often utilizes the phrase, “that which we call animal.”  This 
phrasing is purposeful and is understood in his emphasis on the low status of the nonhuman 
animal in Western philosophical discourse.  Derrida is critical of Cartesian ideology and other 
ontological perspectives that relegate the animal to a mechanical form.  However, he is also 
critical of rights discourse, which seeks, he contends, “homogenous continuity between what 
calls itself man and what he calls the animal.”13  Of the human-animal divide, Derrida 
emphasized that a difference does exist: “To suppose that I, or anyone else for that matter, could 
ignore the rupture, indeed that abyss, would mean first of all blinding oneself to such contrary 
evidence.”  In regard to the Cartesian and Kantian discourse, Derrida responds,  
Their discourses are sound and profound, but everything in them goes on as if they 
themselves had never been looked at, and especially not naked, by an animal that 
addressed them.  At least everything goes on as though this troubling experience had not 
been theoretically registered, supposing that it had been experienced at all, at the precise 
moment when they made of the animal a theorem, something seen and not seeing.14 
 
Both philosophical approaches place humans in what Derrida perceives as a privileged position. 
Although one approach determines that humans have qualities that animals do not (such as 
language or reason) and that therefore make humans superior to nonhumans, the oppositional 
11 Derrida, 17-18. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 53. 
14 Ibid., 31-33. 
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position negates the distinctiveness of each animal species (whether that be human animals, 
primates, felines, insects, etc.) by seeking one trait that all or most share, such as the ability to 
experience pleasure or pain.  For Derrida, each species is unique and both dominant positions 
that is, the Cartesian/Kantian and the rights position in philosophy discount this uniqueness.  
This, Derrida contends is a limit of Western philosophy as it applies to the human and nonhuman 
animal. 
 As Derrida explores the perceived distinctions between that which we call human and 
that which we call animal, he examines Jacques Lacan’s claim that language acts as the single-
most differentiating factor between the two.  Notably, Lacan contends that animals can only 
react, not respond, to stimuli.15  According to Derrida, “Lacan claims to be relying on what he 
blithely calls the ‘animal kingdom’ in order to critique the current notion of ‘language as a sign’ 
as opposed to ‘human languages.’  When bees appear to ‘respond’ to a ‘message,’ they do not 
respond but react; they merely obey a fixed program, whereas the human subject responds to the 
other, to the question from or of the other.”16  Derrida relates this position to Cartesianism in the 
sense that the “Cartesian animal like its descendants, would remain incapable of responding to 
true questioning.  For it lacks the power of real questions.”17  He does not refute these linked 
positions, but instead understands them as limits that need to be deconstructed.  Derrida utilizes 
Lacan’s example of bees and their perceived lack of responsiveness and contends that human 
language, similar to that of the bee, seeks a response from another.  According to Derrida, “For 
the function of language is not to inform but to evoke.”18  Derrida understands the similarity 
through the intention of responses because language is composed of signs.  Yet, Lacan 
15 Derrida, 177-179. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 126-127. 
18 Ibid., 179-180. 
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differentiates between signs in human language and coding in animals, contending that coding is 
fixed while signs in human language results from human interaction.19  Derrida explains, “What 
he (Lacan) attributes to signs that, ‘in a language’ understood as belonging to the human order, 
‘take on their value from their relations to each other’ and so on, and not just from the ‘fixed 
correlation’ between signs and reality, can and must be accorded to any code, animal or 
human.”20  For Derrida, language is meant to incite a response and both human and animal 
“language” incite a response.  A human who has ever spent any time with cats or dogs would 
have to agree that whether by their gazes or other mannerisms, their intention is often to incite a 
response. 
 Lacan’s idea on reaction and response relate to a similar concept he proposes about the 
subject and the other and how both relate to language.  Lacan claims that one differentiating 
factor between human animals and nonhuman animals is that humans can lie.  Derrida explicates 
Lacan’s position: “Why do you tell me that you are going to X in order to have me believe you 
are going to Y, whereas you are indeed going to X?”21  It is through this analogy posed by Lacan 
that Derrida explicates Lacan’s position on animals: “According to Lacan it is that type of lie, 
that deceit, and that pretense in the second degree of which the animal would be incapable, 
whereas the ‘subject of the signifier,’ within the human order, would possess such a power and, 
better still, would emerge as subject, instituting itself and coming to itself as subject by virtue of 
this power. . .a power that is conscious of deceiving by pretending to pretend.”22  Although 
Derrida does not necessarily refute this claim, he contends that Lacan, in common with those 
philosophers who came before him, adheres to a position that  holds what an animal lacks is a 
19 Derrida, 179-180. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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lacking in and of itself, instead of something reflective of the human—animal divide.  The 
animal’s lack of an ability to pretend to pretend is not the animal’s lack of this ability, but what 
Lacan’s subject lacks.  It is what the human lacks that gives him/her dominion over animals.23  
Derrida explains,  
The animal does not know evil, lying, deceit.  What it lacks is precisely the lack by virtue 
of which the human becomes subject of the signifier, subject subjected to the signifier.  
But to be subject of the signifier is also to be a subjecting subject, a subject as master, an 
active and deciding subject of the signifier, having in any case sufficient mastery to be 
capable of pretending to pretend and hence being able to put into effect one’s power to 
destroy the trace.  This mastery is the superiority of man over the animot.24 
 
Derrida contends that the problem becomes the human.   What gives him/her the authority to 
evoke the idea that an animal is without something, when humans cannot be sure that other 
humans possess it?  It is this assumption, one that claims to know what is behind the gaze of a 
cat, for example, which has led to the historical conception of the animal as lacking.25  Likewise, 
it is through such arrogance that animals have been subjected to such harsh realities as factory 
farming. 
 Several themes prevail in Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am, but the entirety of 
the work centers on the binary division between human and animals and how philosophers and 
other scholars have interpreted these distinctions.  Through his “limitrophy,” Derrida coins the 
term “animot” as a substitute for the term animal.  Marie-Louise Mallet’s foreword to the work 
expresses Derrida’s concern for the violence perpetrated against animals and his inception and 
23 Derrida, 180. 
24 Ibid., 187-188.   
25 Ibid. 
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use of animot to underline the “extreme diversity of animals that ‘the animal’ erases, and which, 
when written, makes it plain that this word ‘the animal’ is precisely only a word.”26  
Steiner, in common with Derrida, questions, “How are we to realize a sense of belonging 
together with animals in the whole of nature, without committing the Jacobin excesses of a 
romanticism that sacrifices the individual for the (supposed) good of the whole?”27  It seems that 
this choice of belonging (or not) with animals in the whole of nature would call for the 
abandonment of moral theory altogether or at least the development of a theory that would 
attribute to humans and animals an equal moral value.  Even in developing a new theory, would 
humans not be guilty of interpreting the nonhuman animal experience from what they value in an 
ethical obligation to animals? 
 Steiner maintains that “If we abandon theory, we are forced to rely too much on intuitions 
that are susceptible to subjective viewpoints and acculturation.”28  But with each ethical 
approach another problem arises for the nonhuman animal: “The rights approach privileges those 
beings most capable of asserting their own rights.  Utilitarianism makes the pleasures and pains 
of more sentient beings count more in the social calculus.  And appeals to kinship threaten to 
place creatures such as oysters, which lack even a central nervous system and hence the capacity 
for any cognition or sentience, on a moral par with human beings.”29 Steiner’s solution is an 
approach that confirms the unique qualities of human animals but does not give humanity an 
“absolute priority” over nonhuman animals.30 The merger of anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric ethics results when approaches seek to resolve the difficulties of the human—
animal divide while maintaining the significance of capacities and kinship.  According to 
26 Marie-Louise Mallet, Foreword to The Animal That Therefore I Am, by Jacques Derrida, 9-10.   
27 Steiner, 222. 
28 Ibid., 223. 
29 Ibid., 225. 
30 Ibid. 
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Steiner, “A balance or harmony between the liberal and holistic approaches on the side of ethics 
corresponds to the harmony between capacities and kinship approaches that I propose on the side 
of ethology.  The two sides of this project are linked by the endeavor to do justice to animals 
without losing sight of those qualities that are distinctively human.”31 As Steiner contends,  
 They (nonhuman animals) can fare well or ill, regardless of whether they are 
 ‘subjectively aware’ of their fortunes, and regardless of how much their awareness 
 resembles our own.  In this respect, invertebrates such as bees are like many other 
 creatures, from dogs and cats to apes and monkeys to human beings.  It is here that the 
 capacities and kinship views meet: Capacities are not confined to capacities for subjective 
 awareness but include capacities for growth and flourishing.  Beings with either of these 
 sorts of capacities have a fundamental kinship with human beings.  On the basis of this 
 complementary conception of capacities and kinship, the doctrine of belonging 
 (oikeiosis) could be reconceived so as to constitute a sphere of kinship among all beings 
 that struggle for life and well-being.32  
 
Yet, the oppression of nonhuman animals continues today to such an extent that it can be 
appreciated only through a comparison to the most extreme historical episodes of human 
suffering.  These appraisals are not only necessary in recognizing the abhorrent practices that 
continue today against the oppressed, but also are paramount in abandoning the trans-historical 
conception of the animal as significantly inferior to human animals. If we, as humans, can 
progress past our purely anthropocentric perspectives, maybe then our shared struggles for life, 
the finiteness of the human and animal body, and the vulnerability that lies at the very core of 
every being will abide as the greatest unifying trait between that which we call human and that 
which we call animal.
31 Steiner, 230. 
32 Ibid., 250. 
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AFTERWORD 
Having been raised in the foothills of the Great Smoky Mountains in East Tennessee, the 
culture and environment of the area profoundly shaped my actions, interests, and beliefs from a 
young age.  My parents, holding deep ties to the region, were products of a similar cultural text 
that they passed to their children.  For me this meant a Christian indoctrination, an ideology of 
what is right and wrong, normal and abnormal.  This cultural text encouraged conformity to 
southern Christian culture while disparaging difference, and it elevated my father over my 
mother, my white neighbors over my black ones, and of course humans over animals. 
Ever since I was old enough to hold a fishing rod or squeeze the trigger of a shotgun, my 
father brought me with him to fish and hunt.  I remember killing my first dove and skinning my 
first rabbit, and I can still recall the excitement I felt when my father told me I was finally old 
enough to go deer hunting.  In our garage, my family kept a large freezer stocked all year with 
venison, flesh from deer killed by my father or uncle.  In our home meat was a staple and I 
believed a meal was incomplete without it.  My beliefs as a child echoed the beliefs of my 
parents and the majority of the people in our small southern community.  I resided in an area of 
immense natural beauty and wildlife, where hunting and fishing were cultural traditions, just like 
any other hobby or sport.  It was not until I was older that I realized my rationalization for 
hunting was false.  This rejection of a years-long practice stemmed from an episode I 
experienced while dove hunting.    
Coming upon a shot dove I was instructed to retrieve, I discovered the fallen animal lying 
wounded, but alive.  The buckshot had torn through the bird’s wing just missing vital tissue.  The 
common practice for hunters who confronted a wounded bird is to break the animal’s neck to end 
its life.  But as the small creature lay helpless on the ground before me, it was then that I realized 
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the error of my ways, the falsity of my indoctrination, and the wrongness of a traditional practice 
that I always considered innocent.  At the time, I was unfamiliar with ethics, had never stepped 
foot into a college classroom, and was unaware that at that very instance millions of animals 
across the world were suffering as a consequence of human dominion, just as the dove laying 
before me.   
Animals within the factory farming industry, those locked in cages awaiting painful 
experimentation, and animals hunted and killed, and all are hidden away in the shadows of 
human dominion.  Before we can truly liberate animals and fight to end their suffering, the 
shadows under which they suffer must be pushed away. I believe revealing the immense 
suffering inflicted on animals across various practices is paramount to affect change.  To some 
extent, all people are blinded by their own cultural indoctrination and socialization, which, at 
least in part, is responsible for obscuring many of the moral wrongs committed by human 
animals.  We rarely view our consumption of meat, our purchase of certain products, or our 
“normal” practices such as hunting as contributing to animal suffering.  It is because of this false 
perception of normality that informing the consumer of the horrors of hunting, vivisection, and 
intensive farming practices, among other cruel and unnecessary evils we inflict on animals, 
becomes the catalyst to begin alleviating centuries of wrongdoing.  It is essential that humans 
witness the anemic veal calf crying for his mother, the pregnant sow confined to such degree that 
she is unable to turn around in her crate, the beagle in the laboratory used for cosmetic testing 
who has never felt the warmth of the sun, the circus elephant whose scars detail a lifetime of 
abuse, or the dove wounded by gun fire who will never again fly alongside her lifetime mate.  It 
is imperative that we see the violence, pain, and suffering our way of life inflicts on others.  Only 
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then will we as humans truly see what resides in the shadows of our own dominion and begin our 
transition from oppressor to liberator. 
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